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Attaining an adequate level of defense at an acceptable cost is
as vital and elusive a goal as any the United States has pursued
since World War II. No aspect of this goal has proven more
vexing than the search for an effective process for purchasing
armaments of reasonable price, satisfactory performance, and
timely delivery.' News accounts abound with reports of serious
deficiencies in weapons projects that are central to this country's
defense. 2 Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
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1. The deficiencies of the weapons acquisition process since World War II have been
identified and analyzed extensively in the reports of three blue ribbon commissions created
by Congress or the President. See PREsIDErs BLUE RIBRON COMM'N ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT,
A Querr FoR ExCEiteNcE-FNA. REPOtT -1 THE PRF.StrNr (1986) [hereinafter PAWAD
COuMIssbON]; BLUE RissON DEFENSE PAN., REPORT rT TiE PRSIDENT AND TIE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE ON TnE DEPARTMFr OF DEFENSE (1970) (hereinafter Fr1ziiurH COMMISSION]; COMMISSION
ON ORG. OF T11E EXECUTIVE Btt t OF GOV'T, TAsK FORCE ON PtocuitEmFNr, REPORT ON MILrrARY
Psaocummrm- (1955) [hereinafter HoovER COMMIssION TAK FORCE]. The findings of these
studies arc examined in Kovacic, Blue Ribbon Defense Commissions: The Acquisition of Major
Weapons Systems, in ARMs, PoLrncs, AND -TIE ECONOMY: HIroRICAL AND CONTEMPOUIotY PERSPECIVES
(R. Higgs ed.) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Awhs, POLmCs, AND TE ECONOMY].
2. See, e.g., Moore, Problems Ground Most BI Bombers, Wash. Post, Aug. 28, 1988, at
A4, col. 1; Rosenbaum, Pentagon Fraud Inquiry: What Is Known to Date, N.Y. Tunes, July 7,
1988, at Al, col. 3; Smith, Cruise Missile Reported Late, over Budget, Wash. Post, Apr. 21,
1988, at A37, col. 1; Problems Reported in Secret Satellite Program, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 1988,
at C3, col. 1; Read, Northrop Missile Is Behind Schedule and Beset by Problems, Air Force Says,
Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1988, at 18, col. 4; Wilson, Navy Says Nuclear Subs over Budget, Wash.
Post, Mar. 8, 1988, at A3, col. 4; Harris, Indictment Charges Rockwell, 2 Workers Double-Billed
U.S. for Satellite Work, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1988, at 34, ol. 5; Moore, MX Reliability in
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supplier community have been shaken by a flurry of disclosures
and the first indictments emanating from the Department of
Justice's investigation of allegations of corruption in weapons
acquisition-"Operation Ill Wind."' Accounts of inefficiency, poor
system performance, and misconduct in individual programs are
becoming so common that they obscure what is at stake. Quite
simply, failure to solve the problems of weapons procurement will
put both the country's economic well-being and its physical
security at risk.
The latest round of scandal and investigation is occurring at
the end of an already turbulent decade in weapons procurement
policy. Since 1981 the United States has undertaken the largest
program of peacetime expenditures for defense in its history.'
Even before the Ill Wind inquiry was disclosed, the sheer volume
Question, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1987, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter Moore, MX Reliability in
Question]; Moore, GAO Sees $6 Billion Rise in B-i Costs, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1987, at A10,
col. 1. Stories concerning ongoing programs have not been uniformly gloomy. See, e.g.,
Carrington, Trident H Missile Wins Panel's Praise as Lone Success in U.S. Strategic Triad, Wall
St. J., Mar. 28, 1988, at 24, col. 1.
3. On January 6, 1989, federal prosecutors disclosed the first results of an
investigation that began in September 1986 under the supervision of the office of the
United States Attorney in Alexandria, Virginia. The prosecutors revealed that Hazeltine
Corp., a subsidiary of Emerson Electric Co., had agreed to pay almost $2 million in
criminal fines, civil penalties, and court costs, and had pled guilty to conspiring to defraud
DOD. The government officials also stated that they had obtained an indictment against
Teledyne Industries, Inc. for bribing a Navy contracting official to influence a contract
award. In announcing the Hazeltine guilty plea and the Teledyne indictment, U.S. Attorney
Henry E. Hudson predicted that "[o]ver the next few months, perhaps the next year,
youll see a great deal of additional activity." Murphy & Marcus, Major Defense Firm Admits
Conspiracy, Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1989, at AI3, col. 6. The first trial resulting from the Ill
Wind inquiry began on April 3, 1989 and resulted in the conviction of two Teledyne
executives on charges of conspiracy and wire fraud. See Murphy. Two Teledyne OficiaLs Guilty
in Pentagon Case, Wash. Post. Apr. 14, 1989, at A4, col. I.; Shenon, First Pentagon Fraud Trial
Opens, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1989, at DI, col. 1. Through the conclusion of the trial of the
Teledyne officials, a total of two companies (Hazeltine and Teledyne) and 14 individuals
had entered guilty pleas or had been convicted. See Murphy & Marcus, Convictions, Guilty
Pleas Rise as Pentagon Probe Progresses, Wash. Post, May 10, 1989, at Al, col. 5; Murphy,
Consultant Pleads Guilty in Pentagon Buying Probe, Wash. Post, Apr. 1, 1989, at A2, col. 5;
Wines, Company Adviser Files Guilty Plea in Pentagon Case, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1989, at Al,
col. 4; Wines, Ex-Unisy Official Admits Paying Bribes to Get Pentagon Contracts, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 10, 1989. at Al, col. 5.
The origin and content of the Ill Wind investigation are discussed in Shenon, Inquiry
Is Delayed in Pentagon Fraud, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6. 1988, § 1, at 35, col. 1; Pound, Weapons
Inquiry Soon Will Provide a Look at Consultants' Role, Wall St. J., July 19, 1988, at 1, col. 6;
The Enemy Within, U.S. NEws & Woa REP., July 4, 1988, at 16; Wilson, Defense Fraud
Charges Said to Be Months Off, Wash. Post, July 1, 1988, at AS, col. 5; Rosenbaum, supra note
2.
4. See J. EPSTX.IN, Tnz 1988 DEFENSE BuoDGr 1-15 (1987); W. KAIu MN, A REASONABLE
DEFENSE 23-30 (1986).
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of recent defense appropriations-more than $2.02 trillion from
fiscal years 1981 through 1988 5-had intensified longstanding
concerns about the adequacy of DOD weapons acquisition
policies.6 Reports of mismanagement had aroused fears that these
increased outlays had not correspondingly improved defense
capability. These concerns moved Congress to match its unparal-
leled series of peacetime spending measures with new statutes
intended to improve the weapons acquisition process.' These
congressional initiatives, coupled with the 1986 Packard Commis-
sion report on defense management,' elicited new DOD procure-
ment reform efforts and accelerated preexisting ones.'
5. See FiscAL YEA 1989 DF'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. TO CONG. 297 (Feb. 18, 1988)
[hereinafter 1989 DOD ANN. FIscAL REP.]; FIscAL YR 1988 DEP'T Ov DEFENSE ANN. REP. TO
CONG. 325 (Jan. 12. 1987) [hereinafter 1988 DOD ANN. FIscAL REP.]; FIscAL Y aR 1987 DEP'T
OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. TO CONG. 313 (Feb. 5, 1986) [hereinafter 1987 DOD ANN. FIscAL REP.];
FisCm. Ym 1983 DFP'T OF DEFENSE ANN. REP. TO CONG. IV-3 (Feb. 8 1982) [hereinafter 1983
DOD ANN. FIscAL REP.]. For fiscal year 1989, Congress has authorized $299.5 billion in
defense spending. See Carrington & Yang, Congress Clears $299.5 Billion Package for Defense
After Impasse Is Ended, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1988, at 62, col. 5.
6. Since 1981 there have been many additions to the literature reviewing and
criticizing specific weapons acquisition programs and defense procurement policy generally.
For representative critiques of individual programs in this period, see N. Koiz, WiLD BLUE
YONDE.R: MONEY, POLITICS AND TH1E B-1 BOMBER (1988); P. TYLER. RUNNING CgrrCAL-THE SILENT
WAR, RicxovEa. AND GENERA. DYNAMIcs (1986) (discussing Navy's nuclear submarine program).
For critical evaluations that address broader features of defense procurement, see W. ADAMs
& J. BocE, ThE BIGNESS COMPLEX 327-47 (1986); CENTE FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, U.S.
DEFENSE AcQuISmON: A PRocEss IN TROUBLE (March 1987); J. COATES & M. KILIAN, HZAvy
LoSSES: ThE DANGEROUS DECUNE OF AMERicAN DEFENSE (1985); J. FALLows, NATIONAL DEFENSE
(1981); J. Fox, THlE DEFENSE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE: WEAPONS AcQuisrrIoN (1988); J. GANSLER,
AffORDING DEFENSE (1989); R. HAOmLoN, To ARM A NATION (1986); J. LEHMAN, JR., COMMAND
OF TIlE SEAS (1989); E. LUrrrwAR, TIlE PENTAGON AND TlE ART OF WAR (1985); T. MCNAUGHER,
NEw WEAONS, OLD POuTrcs-AERIcA's MILrrARY PROCUREMENT MUDDLE (1989) (forthcoming);
D. PILLING, CoMPITriON IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT (1989) (forthcoming); D. RAsoR, THE
PENTAGON UNDERGROUND (1985); A. STUBBING, TIHE DEFENSE GAME (1986); THE DEFENSE RE'ov.
DEBATE (A. Clark IV, P. Chiarelli, J. McKitrick & J. Reed eds. 1984); What's Wrong with the
Way We Buy Weapons-A Conversation with Lawrence J Korb and Thomas L Mclqaugher,
BRoOVINGS REv., Fall 1988, at 3.
7. For a description of the chief legislative reform initiatives adopted in the 1980s,
see Kaeser, Major Defense Acquisition Programs: A Study of Congressional Control over DOD
Acquisitions, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 430 (1987).
8. PACKARD COMMISSION, supra note 1. See also Kovacic, supra note 1 (analyzing Packard
Commission's findings and their influence upon DOD procurement policy).
9. See Cushman, Pentagon Tightens Its Buying Rules, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1986, at E4,
col. 3. Aside from the competition-oriented measures addressed below, Congress and DOD
have pursued essentially four types of reforms in this decade. The first is to improve the
management of the procurement process. Among important steps to this end was the
creation in 1986 of the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. See 1988
DOD ANN. FISCAL REP., supra note 5, at 114. The second is to require contractors to invest
more of their own resources to finance early program development. See Stevenson, New
Risks in Military Deals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1987, at DI, col. 3. The third is to increase the
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The most striking feature of defense procurement reform in
the 1980s has been its emphasis, previously unequalled, on
competition-oriented strategies for buying major weapon systems."0
The recent competition initiatives constitute the country's boldest
weapons acquisition reform since World War II. As a matter of
form, the expanded use of rivalry-based purchasing methods
departs sharply from past regulatory practice." For most of the
postwar era, defense procurement regulation was modelled after
regulation used to control public utilities.'2 The recent competi-
tion experiment departs from this model and substitutes rivalry
among defense suppliers to ensure good performance throughout
the acquisition life cycle." Although rarely mentioned in scholarly
stability of major procurement programs through biennial budgeting and greater use of
multiyear production contracts. See Lindsay. Congress and the Defense Budget, WASH. Q., Winter
1988, at 57. The fourth is to expand enforcement-including more frequent resort to
criminal prosecutions--of contractor compliance with cost and pricing regulations and
quality control requirements. See Overly, Government Contractors, Beware: Civil and Criminal
Penalties Abound for Defective Pricing, 20 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 597 (1987); Shirk & Greenberg, An
Analsis of the Web of Civil and Criminal Liability for Defective Pricing of Government Contracts, 33
CAmT. U.L REv. 319 (1984); Note, Regulating Fraud in Military Procurement: A Legal Process
Model, 95 YALE L.J. 390 (1985).
10. See Burnett, Competition in the Weapons Acquisition Process: The Case of U.S. Warplanes,
7 J. PoL'y AJALYsrs & Morn'. 17 (1987); Stevenson, Competition for Contracts Trims Costs for
Pentagon, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1988, at Al, col. 2; Sugawara, A Winning Strategy in Defense-
Cost War, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1989, at HI, col. 4. The term "major weapon systems"
typically refers to "big-ticket" programs--aircraft, missiles, ships, tanks--that account for
most of DOD's annual expenditures for research, development, and procurement. The
armed services procurement statutes use the term "major defense acquisition program" to
denote weapons acquisition projects whose costs exceed substantial dollar thresholds. See,
e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 2430 (West Supp. 1988) (defining "major defense acquisition program"
as acquisition program that, among other criteria, is estimated to exceed $200
million-based on fiscal year 1980 constant dollars--in research, development, test, and
evaluation expenditures or $1 billion in total procurement outlays--also based on fiscal year
1980 constant dollars).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 45-61.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 32-44. The history of defense procurement
reform since World War II can be described as an ongoing effort to determine and apply
the optimal legal governance structure for buying weapons. Recent contributions from the
new "institutional" economics have made it possible to identify with greater precision and
sophistication the strengths and weaknesses of alternative regulatory regimes. See M. CREW
& P. KLEINDOJEa, THE EcoNoMcs oF PUBLIC UTILrTY REGULATION 146-65 (1986) (discussing
contributions of new institutional economics in evaluation of governance structures for
regulating public utilities).
13. This Article uses the terms "competition" and "rivalry" interchangeably.
Competition, however, does not refer to or imply any form of pure or perfect competition
that would result from the existence of large numbers of competitors, unencumbered flows
of perfect information, or the absence of entry barriers. Such conditions exist for few, if
any, major weapons programs during either system development or production. DOD
competition policy has focused on creating a limited number of rival contractors that
compete with one another at different stages of the procurement process. Thus, competition
252
Vol. 6: 249, 1989
Weapons Acquisition Policy
discourse concerning adjustments in federal regulatory policy, 4
the DOD competition initiatives of the 1980s constitute one of the
country's most significant modern regulatory reform efforts."
can at best encourage economic performance associated with duopoly or highly concentrated
oligopoly market structures. In the context of weapons procurement, such rivalry may well
be a potent stimulus for good economic performance (providing incentives for optimal
system design, timely delivery, and efficient pricing), yet rivalry here is not without its
limitations and risks. See Burnett, supra note 10. at 27-30. See also infra text accompanying
notes 138-60. The application of rivalry in weapons acquisition is best described as a
managed form of competition that holds the potential for securing improvement in the
acquisition process.
14. General assessments of the federal government's choice and implementation of
regulatory reform strategies in the 1970s and 1980s seldom have discussed (or even referred
to) the defense acquisition competition reforms. See, e.g., M. DERTICK & P. QuIcx, THE
POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985); G. EAs & M. Fix, RELIEF Oa REFORM? REAGAs REGULATORY
DILEMMA (1984); PUsLIC REGULATION: NEW PERsPEnVs ON INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES (E. Bailey
ed. 1987); REGULATORY REFORM: WAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1986);
Meyer & Tye, Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries Undergoing a Transition to
Daragulation: A Contracual Equilibrium Approach, 5 YAI.E J. oN REo. 273 (1988). This omission
is characteristic of the cursory treatment weapons acquisition and, more generally, public
contracting have received in the modern regulation literature. Sea Lipsky & Cople, Defme
Contracting: Is Antitrust the Right Cure?, Legal Times, Oct. 14, 1983, at 8 (discussing literature
on weapons procurement). Even in the leading comprehensive prescriptive works on
economic regulation, it is uncommon to find more than a passing reference to the
government's role in regulating the conduct of its suppliers. See, e.g., S. BRE ER, REGULATION
AND rrs REFoRM (1982); A. KAuN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INCENIVES
(MIT ed. 1988); M. Cuw & P. KLEINDORFER, supra note 12.
15. As Alfred Kahn has described it, regulatory reform since the mid-1970s has dealt
with two general categories of industries. The first consists of "structurally competitive
industries" and indudes, among others, airlines, trucking, buses, and railroads. 1 A. KAHN,
supra note 14, at xv-xvi. Regulatory reform in these industries often has taken the form
of substantial loosening (and, occasionally, outright abandonment) of limits upon entry and
pricing. Id. at xvi-xviii; see also S. MORRISON & C. WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EffEcrs OF AIRUNE
DEREGULATION (1985); Moore, Rail and Trucking Deregulation, in REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT
ACTUALLY HAPPENED, supra note 14, at 14.
The second group contains "the more conventionally defined public utilities," including
telephone and electric power companies. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 14, at xvi. For these
industries, reform has involved some attenuation of limits upon entry and pricing and,
more frequently, refinements of traditional regulatory practices to strengthen incentives to
achieve cost reductions and greater productivity. Id. at xvi-xxxii; see also P. Josgow & R.
SCHmALENSE, MARum FOR PowER: AN ANALvSIS OF ELECTRICAL UTILrr DEREGULATION (1983).
Refinements of the latter type have included the application of various productivity incentive
tools. Sea Bellcore, The Impact of Federal Price Cap Regulation on Interstate Toll
Customers (Mar. 17, 1988) (unpublished report on file with authors) (discussing price caps);
Crew & Kleindorfer, Productivity Incentives and Rate-of-Return Regulation, in REGULATING
UTILrTES IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 7 (M. Crew ed. 1987) (discussing use of total factor
productivity incentives).
All of the foregoing reforms-from comparatively sweeping measures, such as the
elimination of entry and price controls, to less extreme approaches, such as the use of price
caps-often are lumped under the heading of "deregulation," even though each reform
entails varying degrees of continuing government supervision of the affected industry. In
speaking of "regulatory reform" or "deregulation" in the context of weapons procurement,
this Article does not mean to suggest that weapons industries are suitable candidates for
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The recent competition initiatives are distinctive not only for their
break from previous regulatory policy, but also for how much
Congress and DOD have staked on their success. Rivalry-enhanc-
ing procurement techniques have shaped the structure and
management of numerous new weapons programs that will occupy
crucial positions in the U.S. armaments inventory well into the
next century. The emphasis on competition has emerged most
vividly in policies that make dual-sourcing' 6 throughout the
procurement cycle DOD's preferred acquisition method. In several
significant cases, the means for executing this approach has been
the formation of rival contractor "teams"'7 that will compete
against each other for design awards. In some instances, former
"teammates" may be called upon to compete among themselves
for production contracts after DOD has chosen a winning design.
In recent months, DOD's rivalry-based regulatory reforms have
begun to emerge from relative obscurity because Operation Ill
Wind has focused attention on military procurement and raised
measures such as the abandonment of entry and pricing limits one has witnessed in the
commercial airline industry. Rather, we speak of regulatory reform in weapons acquisition
to denote the attainment of efficiency-enhancing improvements within a regulatory scheme
that will require substantial, continuing government intervention. In this sense, reform in
defense acquisition is somewhat analogous to the Environmental Protection Agency's efforts
to use market-oriented approaches such as the emissions trading program to reduce the cost
of achieving pollution abatement objectives. See Tietenberg, Uncommon Sense: The Program to
Reform Pollution Control Poliy, in RouLATOiaV Ruoau: WAr ACruALLV HAPPENED, supra note
14, at 269 (discussing EPA's emissions trading program); Tripp & Dudeck, Institutional
Guidelines for Designing Succesftd Tmnsferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369 (1989).
For a discussion of the specific reforms implemented in the area of defense acquisition, see
infra text accompanying notes 45-61.
16. "Dual-sourcing" refers to a collection of methods through which DOD can
establish a second source for the production of a given weapon system. DOD can choose
to create a second source for production when development and production begin, or it
can establish a second source after production has started through "breakouts" and "leader-
follower" arrangements. See K. AAcIusALo, A. HAum, M. HrssE, J. HILLER & G. SMitH,
FAcroas AfFEcriNG THE USE OF COMPEITriON IN WEAPON SYsTEM AoQUIsITION 6-9 (Rand Corp.,
prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering)
(1981) [hereinafter K. AtcmiALD].
17. A "contractor teaming arrangement" is "an arrangement in which (a) Two or
more companies form a partnership or joint venture to act as a potential prime contractor;
or (b) a potential prime contractor agrees with one or more other companies to have them
act as its subcontractors under a specified government contract or acquisition program."
Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 9.601 (1987). The rights and duties of
individual team members ordinarily are specified in contractual documents called teaming
agreements. The legal status of the participants' relationship depends principally upon the
form and content of the teaming agreement. See Experimental Eng'g, Inc. v. United
Technologies Corp., 614 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1980); Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec.
Co., 199 N.E.2d 538 (Mass. 1964); see also Note, 'Team Ventures": Air Technology Corp. v.
General Electric Co., 17 HASNGs LJ. 842 (1966).
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questions about the wisdom of the competition-oriented reforms
of the 1980s. Operation Ill Wind has led some observers to
suggest that the imperative to succeed in a more acutely competi-
tive environment has spurred contractors to use consultants to
gather inside information about DOD's purchasing intentions. 8
Other preliminary accounts indicate that contractors may have
responded to the recent competition requirements by colluding
with each other to rig bids and allocate contract awards. Legis-
lators have reacted to the Ill Wind disclosures by proposing a
collection of new procurement reforms, many of which would
establish additional regulatory controls on the conduct of
purchasing officials and suppliers."
The Ill Wind investigation has created strong sentiment among
policymakers to forego competition and follow the path of most
postwar reform efforts by adopting a more encompassing array
of regulatory controls and procedural safeguards. This Article
urges Congress and DOD to resist this impulse because it is
unlikely that the weapons acquisition process would benefit from
a torrent of new statutes that mandate more extensive regulatory
controls. At best, such an approach would increase regulatory
complexity and cost with few offsetting gains. At worst, it would
deflect attention away from more serious institutional causes of
poor performance in defense procurement.
This Article argues that Congress and the Bush administration
should attempt to refine rivalry-based techniques for purchasing
weapon systems and should reduce existing regulatory require-
ments. This endorsement of rivalry-based methods is not unquali-
fied. DOD's willingness in the 1980s to rely more extensively on
weapon rivalry as a governance regime has been worthwhile, but
18. See Carrington & Pound, Pushing Defense Firms to Compete, Pentagon Harm Buying
Syster, Wall St. J., June 27, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
19. See Rosenbaum, supra note 2; Wilson, supra note 3.
20. Sugawara, Legislators Draft Military Procurement Reforms, Wash. Post, Jan. 17, 1989,
at Cl, col. 4; see Morrison. Tinkering with Defense, NAT'L J.. Sept. 3, 1988, at 2178. The
Outlook for Legislative Activity Affecting Defense, Space, and Procurement Policy, Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) No. 51, at 156, 160 (Jan. 23, 1989). Prominent among the suggested reforms are
measures that would impose limits on the use of consultants, establish broader certification
and reporting requirements, create a new DOD acquisition corps, and increase criminal
penalties for violations of federal procurement regulations. See, e.g., S.2621, The Department
of Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1988, reprinted in Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No.
50, at 140 (July 11, 1988) (controlling contractor use of consultants). As one response to
the Ill Wind scandal, DOD has issued a rule requiring certain contractors to certify that
they have not improperly obtained information relating to a pending contract award. See
DOD Competitive Information Certificate and Profit Reduction Clause, 53 Fed. Reg. 42,945
(1988) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 173).
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DOD has depended excessively upon teaming and dual-sourcing
in formulating competition strategies. The Article proposes that
DOD use other competitive techniques and change the process by
which it formulates competition policies.' Adopting this approach
would be part of a broader effort to simplify the procurement
process, improve the quality of the government's purchasing
personnel, and fundamentally redirect congressional and DOD
monitoring and oversight energies.
This Article uses a perspective that is unusual in the academic
literature concerning weapons procurement." Traditional legal
scholarship in the procurement area has focused on the singular
technical labyrinth of public contracting with only infrequent
application of economic theory involving contracting, rivalry,
innovation, and institutional behavior. At the same time, the
relevant economic literature frequently makes only limited efforts
to relate economic learning to the legal structures that govern
purchaser and seller conduct in the public procurement arena.
This Article attempts a synthesis of the two approaches by
indicating how existing legal and regulatory regimes can be
changed to attain important economic goals.
Part I of this Article reviews the regulatory framework within
which the United States has purchased armaments for most of the
period following World War II. It demonstrates the limited role
of rivalry-based governance structures in this period. Part II
examines legislative and executive initiatives since 1981 that have
mandated or strongly influenced the use of competition-oriented
strategies for acquiring major weapon systems. It focuses on
policies that encourage teaming agreements to develop systems
and dual-sourcing to procure major systems.
Part III analyzes selected characteristics of four new DOD
aircraft procurement programs in which the extensive use of
teaming arrangements and a pronounced emphasis on dual-
sourcing are central elements of DOD's competition policy. It
considers whether DOD has formulated and applied its competi-
21. See infr text accompanying notes 163-89 and 198-217.
22. Because of their paramount importance in DOD's procurement budget and the
nation's defense structure, major weapon systems have served as the primary or exclusive
focus of modern scholarly studies of defense procurement. See W. BALowIN. THE STrtucTUa
OF -liE DEFE.sE MAAKEr 1955-1964 (1967); J. Fox, AsmwIN AumEsrA: How TH U.S. Buys
WFAPONS (1974); J. Fox, supra note 6; J. GANSLER, supra note 6; J. GANSLEt, THE DEFENSE
INDUSTnY (1980); M. PEcx & F. SCrEREa, TIlE WE.AONs AcQuisrrON PRocFss: AN FCONOMIC
ANmi.Yss (1962); F. SczxrxA, THlE WwoNs AcQuismoN PRocEss: EcoNoMIc INcvrnvEs (1964);
M. WEIDENBAUM, THE E oNOMics OF PFAcrmE DEFENsE (1974).
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tion initiatives wisely in recent programs. Part IV presents a
comprehensive approach for applying competition policy in
defense procurement and offers alternative strategies for achieving
DOD's goals. This approach is applied to the Army's Light Heli-
copter Experimental program to show how DOD's procurement
policies might be improved. This Part also proposes changes in
the processes DOD currently uses to formulate and implement
competition strategies.
This Article concludes that reforms should center on improving
the use of rivalry-oriented strategies to achieve better performance
in the weapons acquisition process, particularly in the purchase
of major weapon systems.
I. The Post-World War II Weapons Procurement Regulatory
Environment
The purchase of arms to defend this country's borders and to
protect its interests overseas has been the main concern of
national policy since the earliest days of the republic." However,
the essential processes and institutions that the United States uses
to buy arms today are of relatively recent vintage. Although
antecedents of the defense establishment date back to the turn of
the 20th century, 4  the mobilization program implemented
immediately before and during World War II marked the birth
of the basic public and private institutions through which weapons
procurement takes place today."
23. See 1 Comm'N ON GOV'T PROCUREMENT, REPORT OF TIE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT 163-84 (1972) (describing historical development of procurement process in the
United States) [hereinafter CoMu'N ON GOV'T PROCURuIENT]; see also E. Beo, THE UNITED
STATES NAvY-A 200-Ye HIsroY 1-11, 31-34, 116-20 (1986) (discussing formation of naval
fleet to fight War of Independence and War of 1812); Joy, Eli Whitney's Contracts for Muskets,
8 Pus. CONT. .J. 140 (1976) (discussing federal government's early purchases of firearms);
M. Smri, HAilpEsS Fmav ARMORY AND THE New TeCnaNooY: THE CIHA.LENGE OF CHANGE (1977)
(discussing introduction in early 19th century of firearms manufactured with interchangeable
parts).
24. See, e.g., B. COOLING, GRAY STEEL AND BLUE WATFR NAVY-THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF
AmueIcA's MILITARY INDUSrIAL COMPLEX 1881-1917 (1979).
25. See Higgs, Private Profit, Public Risk. Institutional Antecedents of the Modem Military
Procurement System in the Rearmament Program of 1940-41, in THE FcONOMIC HISORY OF Woaw
WAR II: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIvE (G. Mills & H. Rockoff eds.) (forthcoming) [hereinafter
Higgs, Institutional Antecedents]; R. HIOGS, CRI sIs AND LEvtATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN TIE
Gaownt OF AMERICAN GoVER NENT 211-15. 230-33 (1987) [hereinafter R. HIGoS. CRISIS AND
LEviATIAN]; Reppy, The United States, in THE STRUCrURE OF TilE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 21, 22 (N.
Ball & M. Leitenberg eds. 1983).
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The World War II mobilization experience and the subsequent
onset of cold war tensions determined three fundamental
characteristics of United States weapons procurement. First, the
United States' peacetime military establishment would be compara-
tively large and permanent. Fresh memories of desperate efforts
to rearm following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the
country's assumption of global responsibilities at the war's end
made clear that the United States could not afford to rely on the
equivalent of the small, weakly equipped, and poorly organized
armed forces in place between the First and Second World
Wars.2" Thus, the central priorities of defense reform legislation
enacted immediately following World War II were to improve the
organization of the armed services, to sustain readiness in
peacetime, and to strengthen defense planning."
Second, the war experience demonstrated that future arma-
ments would rapidly evolve in capability and sophistication. 8 More
than any other program, the wartime effort to develop the atomic
bomb and its first delivery system (the B-29) foreshadowed new
generations of weapon systems that would incorporate simulta-
neous state-of-the-art advances in several swiftly changing
technical disciplines."9 The perceived cold war imperative to attain
26. See J. Moore & X. Turner, The Legal Structure of Defense Organization 13-15
(Jan. 15, 1986) (memorandum prepared for Packard Commission) (on file with authors).
Following World War I, the United States ended most new weapons development and
largely liquidated its existing weapons inventories. Despite modest rearmament efforts
championed by President Roosevelt after 1936, the United States entered World War II
with weapons that, with few exceptions, were few in number and poor in quality. See R.
SPEcToR, EAGLE AGANSr THE SuN 9-32 (1985).
27. The first and most significant postwar organizational reforms were adopted
through the National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253. 61 Stat. 495 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 10 & 50 U.S.C.) and the National Security Act
Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-216, 63 Star. 578 (codifed as amended in scattered
sections of 5 & 10 U.S.C.). Together these measures created DOD and its component
Departments of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the
principal military advisory body to the President and the Secretary of Defense; and
established the National Security Council. C. BORKUAND, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1-56
(1968); A. JowN & W. TAYLOR, AMERiCAN NATIONAL SECURrIT: POLICY AND PROcess 58-126
(1984); J. Moore & R. Turner, supra note 26, at 14-19. The proper organization and
management of defense policymaking bodies have been major subjects of debate and reform
legislation throughout the postwar period. See Gruetzner & Caldwell, DOD ReorganizatiotI,
U.S. NAVAL INST. IROC., May 1987, at 136.
28. See B. BRooIE & F. BRODIE, FROM Caosssow TO H-BOMB 200-57 (1973); Reppy,
supra note 25, at 23.
29. The development of the B-29--a project one observer has canled "the greatest
U.S. gamble of the war'-is recounted in E. I.AR RA , COMMANDER IN CHIEF-FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT, HiS LIErUENANrs, AND THEIR WAR 580 (1987). The history of the Manhattan
Project, which developed the first atomic bomb, is treated comprehensively in R. RHODES,
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qualitative superiority, particularly in systems designed to deliver
nuclear weapons or warn of a nuclear attack, ensured that
scientific advances would be applied rapidly to existing and future
armaments.
Third, privately owned firms substantially dedicated to
manufacturing armaments would be the principal means for
achieving large-scale peacetime weapons production. After decades
of relying chiefly on a mix of public arsenals and ad hoc private
efforts to produce weapons, the United States turned decisively
to private companies to meet most of its armaments needs during
World War 11.30 Soon after the War, Congress and DOD decided
that, with limited exceptions, privately owned firms with substan-
tial, permanent defense-related facilities would design and
produce weapon systems in peacetime.3'
Beyond establishing these general characteristics, World War II
and the immediate postwar era defined more clearly the relation-
ship between identifying national policy objectives and procuring
arms to fulfill them. It was during this period that the weapons
acquisition process assumed its modern form, consisting of the
following five interrelated steps: (1) establishing the country's
national security goals; (2) devising a military strategy for
achieving these aims; (3) deciding which weapon systems are
needed to carry out the chosen strategy; (4) buying the needed
weapon systems; and (5) maintaining and upgrading the weapons
throughout their operating lives. Because of the rate of technolog-
ical change, the fourth of these steps-procurement-came to
encompass three distinct activities: research and development
leading to the identification of promising designs, the construction
and testing of prototypes, and full-scale production.
THE MAKINO OF THE AToMic BoMB (1986). The term "weapon system," which reflects the
increasing technological complexity of modern armaments, came into use only in the late
1950s. See J. Fox, supra note 22, at 9.
30. See Higgs, Institutional Antecedmts, supra note 25.
31. The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-413, 62 Stat. 21
(1948) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2301 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), and subsequent
postwar defense acquisition legislation assumed that private enterprise would be the virtually
exclusive supplier of most defense hardware. See Couu'N oN Gov'T PaocuitzwNr, supra note
23, at 171-80; see also I. Hicos, CaIss AND LivLrTHAN, supra note 25. at 214-15. 230-33. The
main exceptions to this trend consisted of facilities for producing fissionable material to be
used in manufacturing nudear weapons. See R. HEwLirr & F. DUNCAN, AToMic SHIELD,
1947/1952 (1969). DOD laboratories and research centers also have been responsible for
developing certain conventional weapon systems. See Fialka, After Nearly 30 Years, Siderinder
Missile Is Still Potent, Reliable, Wall St. J.. Feb. 15, 1985, at 1, col. I (discussing development
of Sidewinder air-to-air missile).
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Since 1945, Congress and DOD have relied on essentially five
strategies to ensure that private firms fulfill defense contracts at
an acceptable cost, in a timely manner, and with suitable quality.
These strategies are competition, disclosure and cost observation,
profit controls, incentive contracts, and cost structure evaluation.
The nature and mixture of the strategies have reflected a
fundamental ambivalence about the correct approach for control-
ling the conduct of arms suppliers. In particular, the means
chosen to move private contractors to serve the public's needs
evince a basic tension between comprehensive public utility
regulation on the one hand and the use of rivalry on the other."2
Each of these five strategies is described in turn below.
A. Competition
The use of competition to improve performance in the
production of major weapon systems has been a stated aim of
U.S. procurement policy since passage of the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947." For most of the postwar era, this goal
has seldom been attained.3 Although contractors often have
competed intensely for initial design and development awards,
until recently sole-source agreements usually formed the basis for
full-scale development and production of most major weapon
systems." Dual-sourcing in production-the most frequently used
competitive acquisition technique-typically occurred only in a
32. The parallels between regulatory approaches that govern, respectively, weapons
contractors and public utilities such as electric companies are discussed in G. Hall, Defense
Procurement and Public Utility Regulation (Rand Corp.) (Sept. 1967) (on file with authors);
Weidenbaum, Arms and the American Economy: A Domestic Convergence Hypothesis, 58 Am. EcoN.
REv. 428 (1968); Weidenbaum, The Effects of Government Contracting on Private Enterprise, 35
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 378 (1966) [hereinafter Weidenbaum, The Effects of Government
Contracting].
33. Pub. L. No. 80-413, 62 Stat. 21 (1948) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2301
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The background of the 1947 Act is described in COMM'N O GOV'T
PROCUREMENT, supra note 23, at 171-72.
34. See Cohen, The Competition in Contracting Act, 14 PUB. CosT. LJ. 1, 10-23 (1983);
The Effort to Increase Competition in Procurement: A Tventy-Year Perspective, Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) No. 42, at 1045 (Dec. 24, 1984).
35. See M. Rich, Competition in the Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems: Legislative
Perspectives (Rand Corp.) (Nov. 1976) (on file with authors); Competition in Defense
Procurement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judicia-, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 883 (1968) (report submitted by M. Weidenbaum, The
MilitaryVSpace Marke. The Intersection of the Public and Private Sectors) [hereinafter M.
Weidenbaum Report].
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small number of programs (most involving missiles) with relatively
large annual and lifetime production runs. 6
B. Disclosure and Cost Observation
In 1962, Congress enacted the Truth in Negotiations Act,"
which compels contractors to submit certain cost and pricing data
to government negotiators before an agreement on the contract
price may be reached. The disclosure mechanism was designed to
give purchasing authorities stronger means for observing con-
tractor costs and for evaluating the reasonableness of sole-source
suppliers' pricing proposals."8 The grant to the government of
broad access to contractor records ensures that required disclo-
sures are made."9
C. Profit Controls
Congress and DOD have established nominal limits on the
profitability of defense contracts by setting contract profit
ceilings.' Below these ceilings, the target profit in any weapons
acquisition contract typically is set through negotiations between
the supplier and the purchasing authority. DOD occasionally
conducts studies to evalute the operation of profit limitations and
36. Dual-sourcing and other competitive acquisition strategies are more likely to yield
net benefits when annual and lifetime purchases are made in large numbers. See infra text
accompanying notes 153-60.
37. Pub. L No. 87-653, 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmrN. NEWS (76 Star.) 528 (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2306a (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). The statute's disclosure
requirements are described in J. CuBNic & R. NASH, Foza~TioN OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
895-97 (2d ed. 1986); Preston, The Tsuth in Negotiations Act: Is a New Definition of "Cost or
Pricing Data" Necessary?, 34 FED. B. NEws & J. 448 (Dec. 1987).
38. See S. REP. No. 1884. 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 2476, 2477.
39. See J. CIBINIC & R. NASH, supra note 37, at 877-82; Overly, supra note 9, at 611-
12. See also Laffont & Tirole, Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms, 94 J. POL. ECON. 614
(1986) (analyzing use of accounting data in negotiating procurement contracts).
40. See 10 U.S.C. § 2306(d) (1982); Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. §
15.902 (1987); see also Burns, Profit Limitation Regulated Industries and the Defense-Space
Industries, 3 BELL J. EoN. & MGr. Sci. 3 (1972); J. CisiNic & R. NASH, supra note 37, at
909-36. For an analysis of the functions of government profit policy, see W. RoGCEsoN,
PROfiT REGULATION OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS AND PRIZES FOR INNOVATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
(Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern
Univ., Working Paper) (Jan. 1988) (on file with authors). The impact of some modern
competition experiments in defense acquisition upon contractor profitability is treated in
Greer & Liao, An Analysis of Risk and Return in the Defense Market: Its Impact on Weapon System
Acquisition, 32 MGMT. SCI. 1259 (1986).
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to assess the effect of DOD policies on overall contractor profit-
ability.4'
D. Incentive Contracts
From the end of the postwar period, DOD relied heavily on
"cost-plus-fixed-fee" contracts for major systems development and
early production .4  Such agreements paid contractors for their
actual costs and set a "fee" that was established as a percentage
of initially estimated total costs. Concerned that such formulas
encouraged firms to use resources inefficiently, DOD in the 1960s
introduced incentive contracts that used a cost-reimbursement
formula but that also made the contractor's profit depend in part
on the firm's success in meeting negotiated cost targets.43
E. Cost Structure Evaluations
DOD's cost oversight and disclosure systems initially focused on
whether the contractor had in fact incurred certain costs and
properly allocated them to its government contracts. In the 1970s
DOD began to conduct periodic reviews of contractor operations
to determine the extent to which suppliers were operating effi-
ciently. This involved the use of "should-cost" and "design-to-cost"
studies on specific contracts to determine whether a firm's
production and management techniques were efficient." One aim
of these evaluations was to set cost negotiation targets based on
what hypothetical efficient contractors would require to accom-
plish specific design and production tasks.
41. See F. Aisrom, M. WoRmiNroTN & L. GOLDSMn'H, CO NrACNO rrH THE FEDEAL
GovzEaimwr 68-73 (2d ed. 1988); J. GANSLEE, supra note 6, at 251-53. See also THE MAC
Gioup, TuE IMPAcr ON DEFENSE CAPABI TY OF CHANGES IN PoCUREMENr AND TAX PouCv (Feb.
1988) (discussing overall effect of DOD and congressional procurement reforms in the 19803
upon contractor profitability). In recent years, GAO has proposed, without success, that
Congress establish a separate government agency that would regularly gather and analyze
data on defense contractor profits. See Carrington. Defense Firms, Facing Budget Squeeze,
Mobilize to Fight Plan for an Agency to Measure Profits, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1987, at 50, col.
1.
42. See Nash, Pricing Policies in Government Contracts, 29 LAw. & CoNrsMP. Paoas. 361,
365-66 (1964); M. Weidenbaum Report. supra note 35, at 898-99.
43. See J. Fox, supra note 22, at 240-43; F. ScHart, supra note 22, at 134-37, 153-
270; Nash, supra note 42, at 365-74.
44. See J. CIBINIC & IL NAsH, supra note 37. at 907. See, e.g., Sovereign, Application of
the Conceptual Model for Setting Design-to-Cost Goals: The ffl-7, in AucroNs, BIDDING, AND
CoN-r.A-nNo: USES AND TiEoav 473 (1. Engelbrecht-Wiggans. M. Shubik & R. Stark eds.
1983).
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In effect, cost structure analyses seek to use administrative
oversight to achieve productivity gains that interfirm rivalry
ordinarily elicits in commercial markets. The usefulness of these
evaluation tools necessarily is limited by the uncertainty associated
with efforts to establish the hypothetical performance baseline by
which DOD's suppliers are to be measured. It frequently will be
difficult for DOD personnel to pinpoint specific causes of
inefficiency and to develop accurate estimates of the cost savings
contractors could realize from improvements. Moreover, contrac-
tors often can respond to a cost structure evaluation by asserting
that it is doing the best possible job and that DOD's conclusions
to the contrary constitute misinformed speculation. The appeal
of recent DOD competition experiments resides largely in their
capacity to stimulate cost reductions not by reference to an
administratively determined performance baseline, but by the
need to surpass the efforts of a rival supplier.
II. The Policy Framework for Recent Competition Reforms
As indicated above, the use of competition to improve the
weapons acquisition process has been a nominal aim of defense
procurement policy for most of the postwar era. What is distinc-
tive about the procurement reform measures adopted since 1980
is the extent to which Congress and the Executive have man-
dated, and DOD has embraced, competition as the point of
departure for planning and executing major systems acquisition.
These measures have attempted to use interfirm rivalry to
supplant, at least in part, administrative controls and governance
structures common to public utility regulation.41
A. Congressional Initiatives
Since 1981, Congress has enacted three significant measures
designed to increase competitive procurement techniques in
weapons acquisition. First, the Competition in Contracting Act of
1984 (CICA)46 requires DOD to use "full and open competition"
45. The Navy's Competition Advocate General stated in 1986 that the Navy had
"found that intensified management oversight of sole source contracts is not an equal
substitute for competitive awards to motivated, cost-conscious contractors." FiscAL YM.a 1986
Off. OF THE COMPITrON ADVOCATE GEN. OF TILE NAVY REP. TO CONG. II-3 (Dec. 1986).
46. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S. CoDE CONe. & ArmiN. NEwS (98 Stat.) 1175 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 10, 31 & 41 U.S.C.).
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through the use of competitive purchasing procedures. 7 CICA
created two mechanisms to ensure its effective implementation.
First, it directed each executive agency and each major purchas-
ing unit within each agency to establish a "competition advocate"
to promote rivalry-based procurement."' Second, the statute
strengthened the ability of disappointed contract-seekers to
challenge contract awards that fail to conform with mandated
competition procedures.4 9
Second, the Defense Authorization Act of 19860 bars DOD
from beginning full-scale development for major systems until the
Secretary of Defense has given Congress an "acquisition strategy."
This strategy must "provide that there will be competitive
alternative sources available for the system (and each major
subsystem) under the program throughout the period from the
beginning of full-scale development through the end of produc-
tion.""'
Third, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 198752
directs the Secretary of Defense to "use a competitive prototype
47. 10 U.S.C. § 2301(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
48. 41 U.S.C. § 418(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). CICA also requires that the head of
the competition advocate's office within each of the armed services "shall be a general or
flag officer if a member of the armed forces or a grade GS-16 or above ...if a civilian
employee and shall be designated to serve for a minimum of two years." 10 U.S.C. §
2318(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Furthermore, the competition advocate in each major
purchasing unit is responsible for "promoting full and open competition" within the
purchasing organization and for "challenging barriers to such competition." Federal
Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 6.502 (1987). This provision also requires the agency
to provide the competition advocate with a staff and other assistance to perform the
advocate's duties.
49. As its most significant adjustment to existing bid protest procedures, CICA granted
broader authority to the Comptroller General to hear challenges to contract awards. 31
U.S.C. §§ 3553-3554 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The statute also gave the Comptroller
General power to suspend further performance on contracts pending resolution of certain
protests filed with the General Accounting Office. In early 1988, the Supreme Court agreed
to consider whether Congress, consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, could
properly give the Comptroller General authority to interfere with the timing of the award
or performance of contracts between executive branch agencies and private parties. The
Department of Justice subsequently requested and obtained dismissal of the case after
Congress amended CICA to withdraw GAO's authority to stay procurement awards for
more than 90 days. See United States Army Corps of Eng'rs v. Ameron, Inc., 809 F.2d
979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1218, cert. dismissed, 109 S.Ct. 297 (1988).
50. Pub. L. No. 99-145, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (99 Stat.) 583 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
51. 10 U.S.C. § 2438(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
52. Pub. L. No. 99-591, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. Nws (100 Stat.) 3341-83
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
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program strategy" in developing major weapon systems." The
measure anticipated the fact that by building competitive proto-
types, DOD and its suppliers would refine manufacturing cost
estimates and reduce technical uncertainty because DOD could
evaluate contrasting design approaches before starting produc-
tion.54
These statutes in effect have established a rebuttable presump-
tion that competition is to be the primary acquisition technique
throughout the procurement life cycle. All three measures permit
DOD to waive the specified competition requirements under
limited circumstances. Acceptable grounds for dispensing with the
stated competition requirements typically include a finding by
DOD that the mandated competition strategy will increase total
program costs without commensurate, offsetting benefits." Such
findings ordinarily must be made in writing and, in some
instances, reported first to Congress."
B. Executive Initiatives
The statutes described above have complemented and, in some
instances, codified parallel executive branch initiatives to use
rivalry more extensively in weapons procurement. DOD's recent
efforts to use competition more extensively began in 1981 with
53. 10 U.S.C. § 2365(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Congress approved a sunset
provision that terminates the competitive prototype requirement on September 30, 1991.
National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, § 802, 1988
U.S. Coo CONG. & AuMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 1918, 2008 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §
2365(e)).
54. See M. Rich & E. Dews, Improving the Military Acquisition Process: Lessons from
Rand Research 39-41 (Rand Corp., prepared for United States Air Force) (Feb. 1986) (on
file with authors). The elements for such an approach were suggested two decades ago by
Professor Nash. See Competition in Defense Procurement: Hearings on S. Res. 233 Before the
Subcomm. on Antiant & Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 193. 194-96 (1968) (testimony of Ralph Nash). For other endorsements see
FrrziIUGH COMMIssION, supra note 1, at 79 (recommending "more use of competitive
prototypes and less reliance on paper designs" in selecting production designs); PACIkuD
COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 56-57; G. Smith, A. Barbour, T. McNaugher, M. Rich & W.
Stanley. The Use of Prototypes in Weapon System Development 36 (Rand Corp.. prepared
for U.S. Air Force) (Mar. 1981) (on file with authors).
55. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2365(c), 2438(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Given Congress's
present preference for competitive procurement techniques, DOD today cannot invoke these
escape clauses at will. In addition to the competition measures discussed above. Congress
in recent years has given serious attention to compelling DOD to dual-source specific major
weapon systems. See, e.g.. Wilson. House Opens Debate on '88 Defense Bill, Wash. Post, May 5,
1987, at A4, col. 3 (discussing consideration of measure to mandate dual-sourcing of the
"Stealth" bomber).
56. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2365(c), 2438(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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the work of a DOD study group headed by then-Deputy Secretary
of Defense Frank Carlucci. The Carlucci panel proposed that
defense purchasing authorities establish management programs
and plans for increasing competition.57 These proposals received
additional impetus in 1982 when President Reagan issued an
executive order requiring executive departments to "[e]stablish
criteria for enhancing effective competition and limiting noncom-
petitive actions."58 In 1986, the Packard Commission recom-
mended that "[flederal and DOD regulations should provide for
substantially increased use of commercial-style competition, relying
on inherent market forces instead of governmental intervention."59
The combination of external and internal policy guidance has
led the three services-especially the Navy-to make rivalry the
basis of many major acquisition programs.60 DOD's reports to
Congress now commonly emphasize competition-related achieve-
ments on many existing and planned weapon systems, and reflect
the armed services' current disposition to apply rivalry-based
methods extensively.6'
57. Among other effects, the "Carlucci Initiatives" helped stimulate Congressional
consideration of measures ultimately enacted in 1984 as the Competition in Contracting Act.
See S. REP. No. 50, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 7-9 (1983).
58. Exec. Order No. 12,352, 3 C.F.R. 137 (1983).
59. PAcAsn CommissioN, supra note 1, at xxvi.
60. Under the leadership of Navy Secretary John Lehman from 1981 to 1987, the
Navy became DOD's leading sponsor of competitive purchasing techniques. See J. LEmw",
JiL, supra note 6, at 242-44; Keller, The Navy's Brash Leader, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1985,
(Magazine), at 31; Pyatt, Procurement Competition at Work The Navy's Experence, 6 YALz J. oN
REo. 319 (1989). In November 1985 Lehman issued Secretary of the Navy Instruction No.
4210.6, which announced that competition would be the Navy's preferred acquisition
method for all programs entering fill-scale engineering development. See FISCAL. YE" 1986
Off. OF TIlE COMPETITION AnDvocATz GEN. OF THE NAvY REP. 1-O CONG., supra note 45, at 111-2
to 111-3. Although they are not as aggressive as the Navy, the other services have increased
their use of competition-oriented purchasing methods significantly. See Morrocco, AF Touts
Competition Bid Plan, Defense News, Mar. 31, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
61. See, e.g., FIsCA. YIsa 1986 Off. oF THE COMPETITION ADvoCAT GEN. OF THE ARMY
ANN. REP. To CONG. ON COMPETITION IN ARMY PROCUREMENT 1-2, 5-12 (Dec. 1986); FIscAL YEAR
1986 Off. OF THE COMPETITION AivocATz GEN. OF THE NAvY RaE. To CONO., supra note 45.
Observing that "[c]ompetition has become the foundation of the Navy's acquisition strategy,"
the Navy Competition Advocate General's fiscal year 1986 report stated that "[ajl1 new
programs begin with the presumption that competition should be present in both the
design and production phases wherever practical." Id. at 111-2 to 111-3.
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III. Competition Policy: Selected Air Force, Army, and
Navy Procurement Programs
This Part discusses the manner in which purchasing authorities
have applied competition doctrines in four existing aircraft
programs. Each service is now pursuing at least one major aircraft
program for which dual-sourcing throughout the procurement
cycle is either planned or under serious consideration. These
programs also rely heavily on teaming, and some use teaming as
the means through which dual-sourcing, particularly in produc-
tion, will occur. This Part evaluates this procurement strategy in
three parts. First, it identifies several important procurement
policy and program characteristics of the aircraft procurements.
Second, it examines how these basic characteristics have led
suppliers to create teams to compete for design awards. Finally,
it discusses the function and objectives of dual-sourcing in these
programs and assesses the rationale for dual-sourcing and the
relationship between teaming and the services' dual-sourcing aims.
A. Basic Procurement Policy and Program Characteristics
Typical of programs incorporating DOD's new procurement
policies are the Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), the
Navy's Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA), the Army's Light
Helicopter Experimental (LHX), and the Navy's V-22 Tilt-rotor
aircraft (Osprey). Because of foreseeable funding constraints, these
four programs (together with the B-2 Stealth bomber) probably
are the largest aircraft projects DOD will initiate over the next
ten to fifteen years.62
Two overriding goals have shaped numerous aspects of the
four programs. First, each program seeks simultaneous advances
in several technological disciplines. Second, each program places
greater weight upon competition and contractor risk-taking
because of a basic dissatisfaction with past procurement policies.
62. The severity of current and future Pentagon funding problems is discussed in
Cushman, The Coming Crunch for the Military Budge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, § 4 (Week
in Review), at 1, col. 1; Wilson, Pentagon Bracing for Two "Waves,' Wash. Post, Nov. 13,
1988, at Al, col. 3; Morrison, The Big Chill, NATL J., June 18, 1988, at 1651.
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1. Simultaneous Advances in Technology
Each of the new aircraft programs envisions dramatic advances
in technology resulting in significant performance gains, improved
maintainability, and lower life cycle costs.63 Among other signifi-
cant effects, pursuing state-of-the-art advances in several disci-
plines at once usually leads to high development and high unit
production costs." These high costs have two effects: the services
start few new programs, and they buy relatively few units of each
system each year.0 The ATF, ATA, LHX, and Osprey systems
promise to be more expensive to develop and to produce than
earlier programs, and annual production rates probably will be
modest.6 Consistent with recent experience, each system probably
will remain in production and service longer than the system it
is intended to replace. 7
By continuing, and probably accelerating, the modern trend of
fewer new program starts and lower annual/total program
purchases, 8 the emphasis on technological innovations has planted
63. See, e.g., Cushman, Plane Makers in Competition, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1986, at D4,
col. 1 (discussing new technologies to be incorporated into ATA and ATF); Isikoff,
Expensive Fight for ATF Contract, Wash. Post, April 26, 1987, at HI, col. 5 (discussing
technological advances envisioned for ATF). An alternative acquisition strategy would be to
pursue more modest advances in technology and to buy larger numbers of less sophisticated
weapons. See generally F. SPINNEY, DEFENSE FAcTs OF LIFE (1985); W. WImT, U.S. TACTIcAL Ant
PowEa: MIssIONs, FoRcEs ANo CoSm (1971); Sprey, The Case for Better and Cheaper Weapons, in
TiE DEFENSE REomv DEBATE, supra note 6. at 193.
64. The most striking recent illustration of this phenomenon is the B-2 bomber,
which is being developed by Northrop on a sole-source basis for the Air Force. Because of
its exotic technological features, the estimated unit cost of the B-2 now stands at $516
million-roughly 40% more than original projections. Current plans call for the acquisition
of 132 aircraft at a cost of $68.1 billion. See Moore, Stealth Bomber to Cost $516 Million; Most
Expensive Military Plane Ever, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1988, at A2, col. 5; Pasztor & Read, Air
Force Halves Its 1990 Stealth Budget; Only Five of Northrop's Bombers Are Sought, Wall St. J., Dec.
19, 1988, at A14, col. 1.
65. See Burnett, supra note 10, at 20-21; M. Rich & E. Dews, supra note 54. at 21-25.
66. The historical trend toward increased unit costs and lower annual production rates
for military aircraft is discussed in J. GANSLER, supra note 6, at 172-177; Burnett & Scherer,
The Weapons Industry, in TIE STRUCTURE OF AMERUCAN INDUMraY (W. Adams ed. 1989)(forthcoming). See also Kennedy, U.S. Naval Aircraft and Weapon Developments in 1988, U.S.
NAVAL INst. Pitoc., May 1989. at 194, 198 (discussing likely cost increases in forthcoming
aircraft programs).
67. M. Rich & E. Dews, supra note 54, at 21-25. If the Air Force and Navy adhere
to announced plans, neither service is likely to procure new fighter aircraft systems other
than the ATF and ATA over the next 15 to 20 years. Id. at 22-26.
68. See Kristof, Stern Times for Arms Makers, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1986, at D1, col. 3.
The principal current exception to this pattern for aircraft procurement is that of the
General Dynamics F-16, which is being produced in relatively large numbers for both the
Air Force and a number of allies of the United States. See Wrubel, Gunning It, FIN. WoRu,
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the seeds of far-reaching structural change in the military aircraft
industry. In the past quarter century, the drive to achieve
sweeping qualitative improvements in new aircraft systems has
meant that a small and declining number of firms have active
production programs.69 Since the mid-1960s, several firms have
ceased combat aircraft production,"0 and current DOD acquisition
plans make further structural realignment inevitable. 1  The
prospect of additional departures and consolidations requires an
assessment of what number and configuration of suppliers is
necessary to preserve adequate industry-wide capability and to
ensure sufficient interfirm rivalry for new programs.
2. Emphasis on Rivalry and Contractor Risk-Taking
The second set of features driving current procurement actions
are specific DOD policies incorporating new or renewed emphasis
on competition and contractor risk-taking."
Mar. 8, 1988, at 22, 24.
69. Only a handful of firms today have active fighter aircraft production programs:
McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, Grumman, Northrop, and Lockheed. See Burnett,
supra note 10, at 17-19.
70. The most significant events include Douglas Aircraft's merger with McDonnell
Aircraft, North American's merger with Rockwell, Republic's merger with Fairchild, and
Vought's absorption into LTV. Fairchild recently exited the airframe industry, and the
Vought Division of LTV now views itself as a subcontractor to major airframe manufactur-
ers. Id.
71. Two of the likeliest candidates for exiting airframe integration and production
are Grumman and Rockwell. See Loss of A-6G Prompts Layoffs at Grumman, Defense News,
Dec. 19, 1988, at 7, col. 1 (discussing reductions in Grumman's work force in wake of
Navy's decision not to convert existing A-6E aircraft into variant designated A-6G); Stevens
& Pasztor, Grumman Job on U.S. Bomber Is Threatened, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1988, at A7, col.
1 (describing possible DOD cancellation of Grumman's A-6E aircraft production program
and adverse affect such decision would have upon Grumman's ability to continue as major
aircraft producer); Isikoff, Bruising Defense Industy Shakeout Clouds Future for Grumman Corp.,
Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1988, at H1, col. 4 (discussing possible exit of Grumman from
airframe manufacturing and integration); Stevenson, Military Contracors Squeezed, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 16, 1987, at D4, col. 4 (discussing possible exit by Rockwell from airframe
manufacturing and integration).
72. These trends are identified and discussed in Hearings on Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 3483-515 (1987) (testimony of defense contractor
executives); see also Gladwell, Are Defense Contracts Worth Cheating For?, Wash. Post, July 10,
1988, at HI, col. 1 (presenting evidence that profit margins are low in defense industry).
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a. Competition Throughout Life of the Program
Most of the aircraft projects mentioned above anticipate the
maintenance of competition throughout the development and the
production phases. For example, the Army will carry out all
phases of the LHX program under competition." Two competing
LHX teams, each with two team leaders, are now in the concept
exploration phase. After the Army picks a single design and the
winning team finishes full-scale development, each team leader
will become a prime contractor. After early purchases, each will
compete year-to-year for a share of annual production. In
addition, teams will develop every major LHX subsystem, each of
which will be dual-sourced in production. The new LHX engines
also are being developed under competition and will be dual-
sourced during production.74
b. Prototyping with Competitive Fly-off
Several forthcoming aircraft programs require production of
competing prototype aircraft. The purchasing military service will
conduct a competitive fly-off to determine which design it will
select for full-scale development." The Air Force expects to
conduct its fly-off for the ATF in the early 1990s, and the Army
has scheduled the LHX fly-off competition for 1993.
c. Significant Contractor Financial Commitment
In recent years, DOD has required contractors to bear greater
financial responsibility for developing new systems.7 6 Although the
Air Force has issued fixed-price contracts valued at $691 million
73. Procurement Rules Are State of the Art, Defense News, Oct. 20, 1986, at 30, col. 1.
74. Similarly, the Air Force has indicated that it will dual-source as much of the ATF
as is feasible, and the Navy plans to dual-source the ATA. See Beyers. AF to Insist Firms Vie
for ATF Components, Defense News, Nov. 10, 1986, at 2, col. 3 (discussing ATF); Wrubel,
supra note 68, at 23 (discussing ATA).
75. See Cushman, supra note 9; Cushman, supra note 63.
76. See Isikoff, U.S. Defense Firms Face Tight Times, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1988, at Fl,
col. 2; Lachica, Defense Firms Claim Reforms Hit Them Hard, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1988, at 9,
col. 3; Kitfield, New Rules, New Risks, New Worries, MIL. Loois'cs F. July-Aug. 1987, at 10;
Stevenson, supra note 71. Cf. Lachica, Pentagon Backs Off from Two Cost Policies, Saying
Suppliers Deserve Fairer Shake, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1988, at 14, col. 3 (suggesting possible
DOD retreat from this policy) [hereinafter Lachica, Pentagon Backs Off]. For a critique of
this approach, see Charles, Better Competition Means Cheaper Arms, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1987,
at 14, col. 3.
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to both ATF teams to build prototypes, both teams will spend
significantly more of their own funds-estimated at about $1
billion for the two teams combined-on their prototypes." Among
other requirements, recent legislation and DOD policies compel
suppliers to pay a larger part of the initial costs of developing
new systems78 and to provide stronger warranties for system
reliability."
d. Use of Fixed-Price Contracts
Several of the aircraft projects anticipate using either firm
fixed-price or fixed-price incentive contracts for both development
and production. For example, the ATA contract that the Navy
recently awarded to McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics
reportedly provides that early production of the new aircraft will
take place under a fixed-price contract formula. 0
e. Increased Contractor Management Responsibility
DOD has delegated greater management authority for system
acquisition to the prime contractors. The LHX team leaders, for
example, will be responsible for managing competition between
the dual-source subcontractors. They must assure that two
producers are bidding on and are capable of producing each
77. See Stevenson, supra note 9; see also Kristof, The Battle for a New Fighter, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 1986, at DI, col. 3.
78. See 10 U.S.C. § 2329 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (reimbursability of special tooling
costs); DOD Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Special Tooling and Special Test
Equipment, 53 Fed. Reg. 6015 (1988) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pL 25).
79. See 10 U.S.C. § 2403 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (warranties). The statutory warranty
requirements are evaluated in R. KuENNE, P. RictCmBACH, F. RIDDELL & R. KAcGAoff,
WARRATrlEs IN WEAPON SvSTu PsocuREso,-r (1988). J. Stucker & G. Smith, Warranties for
Weapons: Theory and Initial Assessment (Rand. Corp.) (Apr. 1987) (on file with authors).
80. See Carrington, McDonneU, Dynamics Get $4.38 Billion Job, Wall St. J., Jan. 14,
1988, at 10, col. 1. In April 1988, DOD indicated that it might retreat from its emphasis
upon fixed-price contracts during development. See Lachica, Pentagon Backs 0f, supra note
76. Congress subsequently moved to discourage the use of fixed-price contracts in this stage
of the weapons acquisition cycle. The Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1989 directs the Secretary of Defense to revise existing DOD regulations to pruvide
that DOD may award fixed-price contracts in development only if (a) the level of program
risk permits realistic pricing, and (b) using a fixed-price contract permits "an equitable and
sensible allocation" of program risk between DOD and the contractor. National Defense
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, § 807, 1988 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
ADmiN. News (102 Stat.) 1918, 2011.
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subsystem, for soliciting and evaluating bids, and for apportioning
production contracts."
B. Teaming
A major result of the existing weapons acquisition environment
and of the specific terms of current programs is that firms form
teams to develop and produce systems. Although teaming on
major aircraft programs is not novel,8" the extent of teaming and
the number of team members on several projects represent
significant departures from past practice."
Contractors have formed teams to develop each of the four
aircraft mentioned above. Lockheed, General Dynamics, and
Boeing are competing against Northrop and McDonnell Douglas
in developing the ATE The team of McDonnell Douglas and
General Dynamics recently defeated the team of Grumman and
Northrop for the right to pursue full-scale development of the
ATA11 The competition for the LHX pits McDonnell Douglas/Bell
against Boeing Vertol/Sikorsky. Because of the Army's dual-
sourcing requirements, each major LHX subsystem has at least
two teamed partners. Bell and Boeing Vertol are teamed for the
Osprey. An important feature of this array of relationships is that
several firms are teammates for one project, but opponents for
another closely related system.
1. Rationales for Teaming
Although the armed services have mandated teaming on some
projects such as the LHX and have encouraged it on others such
as the ATF, ATA, and Osprey, some degree of teaming flows
81. These features of the LHX program are discussed in Procurment Rules Are State
of the Ail, supra note 73.
82. The Navy's F/A-18 fighter aircraft, for example, was developed jointly by a team
consisting of McDonnell Douglas and Northrop. I. DoanEa, Aims DmAL: THE SELLING OF THE
F-16, 41-44 (1983). See also sources cited infra note 97.
83. This trend is discussed in Beltramo, The Trouble with Contractor Teaming, MiL.
LoGirncs F., Mar. 1988, at 35; Carrick, Assessment of the Competitive Contractor Teaming
Acqubition Strategy, 18 NAT'L CONT. MGwr. J. 55 (1984); Morrison, Up in Arms, NAT'L J., July
11, 1987, at 1782; Waskul, Is Teaming Good for Your Health, INtErAvLA Apr. 1987, at 327.
84. See Carrington, supra note 80; Halloran, Navy Awards Contract for Bomber, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 24, 1987, at D1, col. 3.
85. The Army's LHX dual-sourcing requirements have yielded large aggregate teams.
The McDonnell Douglas/Bell team now has approximately 10 members, and the Boeing
Vertol/Sikorsky team has about 15 members.
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naturally from current procurement policies and practices.
Teaming reduces each firm's risk in an increasingly costly and
risky procurement environment. One source of risk is the paucity
of programs and, consequently, the shrinking number of produc-
tion contracts that enable firms to maintain and extend their
technical capability. As mentioned above, for several broad
categories of weapons DOD plans few additional new program
starts in the coming decades. Existing airframe manufacturers that
fail to obtain a role in building the ATF or the ATA will face a
difficult struggle to maintain the technological qualifications to
participate in future development competitions."' Even with
widespread teaming, some decline in the existing number of
airframe producers appears to be inescapable. 7
Teaming also can reduce the financial risk arising from current
requirements that force contractors to bear more of the costs of
developing new systems, to provide stronger warranties, and to
accept fixed-price contracts for relatively early phases of the
procurement cycle. Teaming spreads costs and risks at a time
when DOD policies have compelled firms to "bet their equity" far
more often than before. Although not fully analogous, the
experience of Grumman and Lockheed in the early 1970s, when
both suffered severe losses under "total package procurement
contracts" for the F-14 and C-5A, respectively, is a sobering
illustration of the losses participants in the new aircraft programs
might incur.8 9
86. See lsikoff, supra note 63, at H4, col. 6 (quoting McDonnell Douglas vice president
as calling pending ATF 'competition "a high-risk poker game"); Kristof, supra note 77
(quoting General Dynamics official as calling ATF "a must-win program"); Morrison, supra
note 83, at 1786.
87. For example, it is quite possible that Grumman will slowly exit airframe
production and focus on defense electronics following the failure of the Grumman/Northrop
team to win the ATA contract. See Isikoff, supra note 71. For other accounts predicting a
decline in the number of airframe manufacturers, see Morrison, supra note 83, at 1786;
Stevenson, supra note 71.
88. The Air Force initially discouraged teaming for the ATF program out of concern
that teams would create "an airborne camel." When the Air Force added the requirement
that contractors bear a large portion of the costs of prototyping, it came to recognize that
even the larger ATF contenders viewed such expenses as very risky and even threatening
to the viability of individual firms. The Air Force subsequently encouraged teaming. See
Carrington, Fighter Jet Initiates New Age of Procuremert, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1986, at 6, col.
1.
89. Under total package procurement contracts, firms committed themselves to a
single, fixed price for the research, development, and production phases of the acquisition
cycle. After signing total package procurement contracts to produce the F-14 and C-5A,
respectively, Grumman and Lockheed discovered that they had seriously underestimated
their likely costs and thereby incurred massive overruns. Both firms reached the edge of
Yale Journal on Regulation
In addition to serving as a source of risk reduction, teaming
can be viewed as a response to DOD efforts to seek significant
simultaneous technological gains in numerous areas. 0 Many of
the aircraft program teams represent combinations of diverse
individual company strengths. The Lockheed ATF team, for
example, will use Lockheed's basic design proposal and will draw
heavily upon Boeing's avionics capability and General Dynamics's
armaments and supportability expertise. Teaming allows each
team member to take advantage of the complementary strengths
of all team members.9'
Teaming also allows a firm to augment its strength in at least
one other significant way. The weapons procurement process has
a substantial political dimension. Congress deeply influences
weapons acquisition policy,92 and legislators closely monitor the
distribution of contracts to economic interests within their districts
or states." Programs that disperse benefits across a larger number
of states and congressional districts ordinarily possess an advan-
tage in the appropriations process.9 4 Teaming at the prime
insolvency before DOD agreed to renegotiate the agreements and increase the firms'
compensation. See I. DoRaFE, supra note 82, at 32 (discussing Grumman's overruns on F-
14); A. SAMSON, TiE ARms BAzma 218-19 (1977) (discussing Lockheed's overruns on C-5A).
90. Teaming to obtain defense contracts has a commercial parallel in the formation
of joint ventures to pursue basic research and development that firms regard as too risky
to pursue individually. See Hayes, New M.C.C. Chiefs Strategy: To Speed Payoff on Research,
N.Y. Times, June 24, 1987, at D6, col. 1 (discussing Microelectronics Computer and
Technology Corporation research and development joint venture).
91. Federal procurement regulations single out this rationale as an important basis
for permitting teaming agreements. Section 9.602 states that "[c]ontractor team arrange-
ments may be desirable from both a Government and industry standpoint in order to
enable the companies involved to (1) complement each other's unique capabilities and (2)
offer the Government the best combination of performance, cost, and delivery for the
system or products being acquired." Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 9.602(a)
(1987). The provision goes on to note that teaming "may be particularly appropriate in
complex research and development acquisitions, but may be used in other appropriate
acquisitions, including production." Id. § 9.602(b).
92. See G. AD.mS, TIlE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACrIN (1981); A. Cox & S. KIRBY,
CoNGREss, PARu.mENr AND DEFENCE (1986); W. WEIDA & F. GEaRTciER, THE POLMc.AL ECONOMY
oF NATIONAL DEFENSE 22-27 (1987); Lindsay, Congress and Defense Polity: 1961 to 1986, 13
Aaszo FozcEs & Soc'y 371 (1987).
93. See, e.g., N. Kor, supra note 6, at 123-38, 258-60; Higgs, Hard Coals Make Bad
Law: A Study of Congress and Defense Budget Waste, 8 CATO J. 79 (1988); Wessel, Pentagon's
Anthracite Mound Will Be Monument to Congress and Coal Lobby, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1988, at
66, col. 1; Wilson, House Panel Considers Defense Bill That Hints Strongly of Pork, Wash. Post,
Mar. 29, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
94. Such political considerations are thought to have influenced the Navy in its
decision to increase the number of Cities serving as home ports for Navy combat vessels.
See Carlson, Congress Smooths the Waters for Navy's Home-Ports Plan, Wall St. J.. Mar. 3, 1987,
at 35, col. 1.
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contractor level enables suppliers and the purchasing military
service to build more effective political coalitions by broadening
the potential geographic base of congressional support for a
forthcoming program. While political diversification may benefit
contractors and the sponsoring service by insuring against
program reduction or cancellation, this private gain can harm the
acquisition process because it may protect a program that should
be reduced or eliminated due to changes in military require-
ments, rising costs, or a failure to meet performance goals.9"
2. Shortcomings
Although teaming may entail significant benefits, it may also
lead to substantial problems in current acquisition programs.
Teaming requires close cooperation among team members, yet
each teaming agreement is a potential source of conflict that
might impede effective development or production. The potential
for conflict appears most starkly when members of teams
associated with different but highly related programs overlap. For
example, McDonnell Douglas and Northrop are teamed for the
ATF, but were rivals for the ATA, and McDonnell Douglas and
General Dynamics teamed to win the ATA, but are rivals for the
ATE Bell and Boeing are on competing teams for the LHX, but
are partners for the Osprey, the Tilt-rotor aircraft that will be
able to perform some missions anticipated for the LHX.
The establishment of overlapping, mixed teams lays the
foundation for at least two types of destructive internal conflict.
The first takes the form of one firm's reluctance to provide a
team member with proprietary data or know-how that the team
member might employ in a second program in which the two
firms are opponents. For example, if General Dynamics has
superior expertise in certain areas, it may be reluctant to provide
McDonnell Douglas access to such information for the ATA
program out of concern that McDonnell Douglas will put the
expertise to use on the ATF program. Similar concerns arise for
95. The rent-seeking "advantages" that teaming offers individual team members can
also distort source selection in ways that reduce social welfare. This is particularly true
when one team's skillful construction of an effective political coalition enables it to trump
a rival whose political acumen is weaker but whose technical proposal and qualifications are
superior. Cf. Lee, Public Goods, Politics, and Two Cheers for the Militar-Industrial Complex, in
AaMS, POUtMrS, AND THE ECONOMy, supra note I (suggesting that efforts of private firms to
build powerful political constituencies may be necessary to elicit adequate levels of defense
expenditures).
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the overlapping LHX-Osprey participants. At a minimum,
overlapping team membership would seem to entail complex,
costly efforts to ensure that proprietary data and know-how do
not flow beyond the bounds of the collaborative venture.1
6
The history of the McDonnell Douglas-Northrop teaming
relationship on the F/A-18 program vividly illustrates the data
rights problems team members can encounter. 7 The McDonnell
Douglas-Northrop teaming agreements provided that each firm
would build a distinctive variant of the F/A-18 for sale to the
United States and to foreign governments. To facilitate interfirm
data transfers, the teaming agreements attempted to delimit the
uses to which each firm could apply proprietary data that its
teammate had contributed for joint development tasks for the
F/A-18 program." Disputes over these data agreements contrib-
uted significantly to acrimonious litigation between the two firms.
Northrop accused McDonnell Douglas of misappropriating its
technology and engaging in industrial espionage to secure
information concerning Northrop's proprietary aircraft designs.9
McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand, alleged that Northrop
had taken avionics data McDonnell Douglas had supplied
exclusively for the F/A-18 project and had wrongfully used this
information to enhance the capabilities of Northrop's F-20
fighter.00 Each side claimed hundreds of millions of dollars in
damages resulting from alleged breaches of the teaming agree-
ment data clauses. The lawsuit consumed six years, at least $40
million in out-of-pocket legal costs, and thousands of hours of
time of the companies' highly skilled personnel before it was
settled in 1985.'01
A second drawback associated with teaming stems from
resource allocation choices that individual team members might
be required to make among different high-cost, high-risk
96. See Waskul. supra note 83, at 327.
97. The history of the McDonnell Douglas/Northrop teaming effort on the F/A-18
program is presented in Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1112
(C.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd in part and affid in part, 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
849 (1983). See also R. Nash, Dual Sourcing, in Critical Issues in Contract Competition (Feb.
13, 1987) (unpublished collection of articles, compiled by ABA Sec. of Pub. Contract L.) (on
file with authors). The authors consulted for McDonnell Douglas in this litigation.
98. Northrop, 705 F.2d at 1037-39.
99. Northrop, 705 F.2d at 1038-39 & n.6.
100. See Sanford, Northrop, McDonnell Settle Suit, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 9, 1985,
at 1.
101. See Navy to Recover Legal Fees Billed by McDonnell Douglas for FIA-18 Suit, Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 501 (Mar. 25, 1985).
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programs. For example, firms participating in both the ATF and
ATA competitions might find it necessary to place primary
emphasis on one of the two programs.' No firm has an unlimit-
ed supply of outstanding engineers, and one company's apprehen-
sion that a team member could be channelling its best engineers
and other valuable resources to a separate, related program is a
potential source of disharmony."' Even more disruptive is the
possibility that a teammate on one program might devote its
principal efforts and best resources to succeed in a second
program that competes directly with the first.
Such potential tensions are evident in the LHX and Osprey
programs. Bell is teamed with McDonnell Douglas to submit an
LHX proposal, but also is teamed with Boeing Vertol to produce
the Osprey. In 1987, Bell suggested to DOD that it might be
desirable for the Army to purchase the Osprey to perform some
missions for which the Army had planned to buy the LHX.' 4
This suggestion could not have contributed to nurturing a
harmonious relationship within the Bell-McDonnell Douglas team.
Similar problems arose in the F/A-18 program, where Northrop
accused McDonnell Douglas of inhibiting Northrop's efforts to sell
a land-based variant of the F/A-18 to increase sales opportunities
for McDonnell Douglas's F-15 air superiority fighter.'0
Even when teams do not contain overlapping membership,
teaming may create tensions that inhibit effective, necessary
cooperation. 0 6 When teaming and production dual-sourcing are
mandated, current partners must anticipate future competition 7
102. The possibility that firms participating in both the ATF and ATA programs
ultimately might be forced, because of limited internal resources, to favor one program and
deemphasize contributions to the other is suggested in Stevenson, supra note 9. See also M.
PECX & F. Sciu.F.ia, supra note 22, at 324-85.
103. See Waskul, supra note 83. at 327.
104. See Wilson, Alternative to Copter Project Offered, Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1987, at Al1,
col. 1.
105. Northrop, 705 F.2d at 1039.
106. Regardless of the industry setting, joint venture-type arrangements commonly
confront the participants with difficult transactional problems that stem from the need to
determine how the joint activities will be managed. See Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust
Policy, 95 HAxv. L R.v. 1521, 1529 (1982); L Sn.vtA, Nat oN Joiwr Vi.KtiwEs IN WHCH
FiRws Corriisu'ix COMpi.xF.rRtY INPUrS 16-17 (F.T.C. Working Paper No. 152) (May 1987).
107. For example, the team of McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics is now
proceeding jointly to build an ATA prototype to be completed in the next two to three
years. Once the ATA prototyping effort is completed, the two firms will compete against
each other for the bulk of the annual production run, with the lower bidder receiving
roughly two-thirds of the annual award. See Halloran, supra note 84; Wrubel, supra note
68, at 23.
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and therefore may fail to cooperate fully when exchanging
pertinent design, production, and maintenance information."°
Once again the McDonnell Douglas-Northrop F/A-18 litigation
provides an example of how this type of problem might arise.
Northrop alleged that McDonnell Douglas had withheld informa-
tion essential to Northrop's efforts to design and to produce a
land-based variant of the F/A-18 that Northrop planned to sell to
the U.S. Air Force and to foreign governments. Northrop
envisioned that its version of the F/A-18 would establish the
company as a manufacturer of highly sophisticated, state-of-the-
art aircraft."0 Thus, it claimed that McDonnell Douglas had
withheld data in order to impede Northrop's move into a market
that McDonnell Douglas already occupied.
Team members for any system or subsystem are seldom equal,
and, as suggested above, dual-sourcing can convert these differ-
ences into serious obstacles to effective cooperation. Technologi-
cally more advanced firms contemplating the equivalent of a
prearranged divorce might balk at transferring data and know-
how to less astute teammates who subsequently might use the
information to compete for production awards. As is the case with
situations involving overlapping team memberships, efforts to
solve data transfer and use questions-for example, by contractual
limitations and organizational structures designed to confine data
use to discrete, limited purposes-are likely to be costly to
implement and of questionable effectiveness."0 In the long run,
a predisposition on the part of DOD to require teaming, coupled
with defense firms' perception of weaknesses in regimes for
appropriating the returns to innovation, may seriously weaken
incentives for firms to invest in research and development. If
firms believe that they will be required to team and doubt their
ability to appropriate the returns on their own inventive activity,
108. Commercialjoint ventures sometimes disintegrate because the participants cannot
overcome problems associated with the prospect that the joint venturers might become rivals
with respect to the product that is the subject of the two firms' collaboration. See Kneale
& Putka, Jet-Engine Pact of Rols-Royce, GE Scrapped, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1986, at 39, col.
1 (reporting that General Electric and Rolls-Royce had discontinued joint-production
agreement "because the two companies' cooperation in making jet engines has turned into
competition").
109. See I. DouRI. supra note 82, at 57-74; A. SAMPSON, supra note 89, at 141-53.
110. See Morrison, supra note 83, at 1785 (quoting Weyman B. Jones, Grumman's
vice president for public affairs, as saying that "there's no question that there is an
inhibition [on innovation] when you're working with folks that a year from now will be
your competitors").
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they are likely to decrease investments in desirable research and
development.
Finally, intrateam tension also can arise from the efforts that
each team member makes to claim credit for accomplishments
achieved during the course of the collaboration. Defense contrac-
tors routinely seek to convince the U.S. armed services and
potential foreign purchasers of their technical skill and production
capability. For products developed or produced through teaming,
this claiming of credit can cause each team member to attempt to
persuade purchasers that its contributions to the joint program
were superior to those of its teammate."'
3. An Approach to Teaming
Although teaming may increase efficiency, it also may foster a
distrustful environment that can lead to a general failure by
contractors to resolve difficult issues. Optimal use of teaming
requires a careful evaluation and balancing of potential costs and
benefits, and each new program must be evaluated individually.
However, several generalizations are appropriate. Teaming is
more likely to have a net positive effect (1) when system costs are
very high and (2) when the expertise needed to achieve technical
targets requires the complementary skills of more than one firm
and demands close cooperation of the firms that cannot be
accomplished by less drastic contractual techniques, such as
conventional prime contractor/subcontractor relationships.112
11. It also should be noted that the corporate cultures of team members typically
vary, often significantly. Different aerospace company styles can result from conscious
management decisions. Some firms cultivate an open-door, freewheeling atmosphere, while
others establish a structured, formal tone. Different styles may also simply stem from the
distinctive character that a geographic location, be it Long Island or Southern California,
can impart to a firm's laborers and professional staff. Whatever their basis, such differences
in corporate cultures often can yield strikingly different ways of approaching design,
development, and production tasks. Such differences are not easily overcome and may
generate serious conflict.
112. Teaming is only one form of contractual relationship among contractors. In the
past, major systems usually have been developed and produced by prime contractors that
subcontracted important portions of the total system to other firms. For example,
Westinghouse developed and now produces the radar set for the F-16 under a subcontract
with General Dynamics, the airframe manufacturer and systems integrator. Teaming takes
interfirm cooperation one step further and integrates more fully total system design among
several firms. Additionally, unlike most prime contractor/subcontractor relationships, the
teams now assembled typically consist of horizontal competitors. Such teammates ordinarily
regard themselves as prime contractors and, left to their own desires, would prefer to have
sole or principal responsibility for designing, integrating, and assembling the system.
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Second, despite its potential benefits, teaming can entail
formidable costs, particularly as DOD has applied it to the aircraft
programs discussed above. These costs are sufficiently high that
DOD should approach new programs with a presumption
disfavoring policies that mandate or strongly encourage teaming
arrangements involving horizontal rivals.' DOD should be
especially wary of establishing teams when industry participants
already are cooperating on closely related programs that incorpo-
rate closely related technologies. Teaming in these circumstances
runs substantial risks and creates significant costs that promise to
undercut the DOD's acquisition goals. Prominent among these
risks are efficiency-reducing lapses in necessary interfirm coopera-
tion and diminished incentives for individual companies to
innovate. Similarly, the use of teaming as a platform for future
dual-sourcing should be discouraged. Other strategies for
qualifying a second source, while entailing nontrivial costs of their
own, are likely to be less costly avenues to dual-sourcing. One
such example is transferring data packages and know-how to a
second supplier upon moving to full-scale production.
More generally, policies that mandate or strongly encourage
teaming among direct rivals are ill conceived because they more
often than not will place decisions about choosing the appropriate
structure for interfirm relationships in the wrong place. Compared
to DOD, individual contractors have superior knowledge about the
different transaction costs of doing business with other contractors
and with using various types of integration to order their
relationships with these firms. For this reason, it would be wise
to presume that contractors are in the best position to determine
what transactional form-contract, joint venture, teaming, or
merger-will provide the most efficient path to designing and
building a given weapon system.
Given the potential problems with teaming, defense suppliers
already are adopting other strategies to adjust to ongoing changes
in the procurement environment. The most notable of these is
113. As discussed below, we would weaken this presumption where foreign suppliers
use teaming as a strategy for entering the U.S. market. See infra text accompanying notes
179-83.
114. In light of typical cost growth and the substantial uncertainty surrounding future
DOD budgets, a program that at its inception appears to be a candidate for dual-sourcing
ultimately may not be purchased in quantities sufficient to warrant such a procurement
strategy when it enters production. See infra text accompanying notes 153-60.
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expanded reliance on mergers and acquisitions."' The prevailing
trend toward fewer program starts and higher cost programs has
caused some firms to diversify through mergers and thereby to
increase the probability of participating in the new large projects.
Other firms can be expected to diversify into related technologies
when the transaction costs associated with teaming and other
contractual forms of integration prove to be extremely high.116
Several aerospace industry acquisitions in recent years have
appeared consistent with these motivations."' DOD must give its
contractors more freedom to select the transactional forms that
they prefer. It should also focus more attention on preserving, in
the face of increasing levels of defense industry mergers, enough
actors in each industry for future design and production competi-
tions.
C. Dual-Sourcing
As discussed in Part I, DOD's procurement reform initiatives
either require or urge maximum use of competition in weapons
acquisition. DOD's preferred competition strategy today is dual-
sourcing, which is not a new weapons acquisition technique. For
example, the United States used dual-sourcing extensively during
World War II to produce fighter and bomber aircraft. In
addition, DOD dual-sourced a number of systems and subsystems
prior to 1980."1 Since 1980, however, dual-sourcing has increased
dramatically, especially for important, expensive systems such as
the Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Missile,"' the Tomahawk
115. Recent DOD and other federal contracting policies appear to have stimulated
expanded merger and acquisition activity involving defense suppliers. See Morrison. supra
note 83, at 1783; Sugawara, New Federal Polcies Thinning Ranks of Government Contractors,
Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 1988, 6 5 (Washington Business), at 1. col. 1.
116. The use of mergers to overcome transaction costs problems is treated in 0.
Wu.tAmsoN, TitK EcoNOMIC IrrmrtnoNs OF CuuIsi 85-130 (1985); Klein, Crawford &
Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriab/e Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L
& ECON. 297 (1978).
117. See Morrison. Winter of DiMconten, NAIL J., Dec. 19, 1987, at 3200, 3203. In
1986-87. Lockheed bought Sanders Associates. an electronics firm. Loral puchased
Goodyear's aerospace division, and General Electric purchased RCA.
118. See F. Scnziat, supra note 22, at 119-26; Asher, Cost-Quantity Relationships in
the Airframe Industry (Rand Corp.) (July 1956) (on filewith authors); K. AactuAw, supra
note 16.
119. See Beltramo, Missiles: Ieaders Face Competition on Most Programs, Mi. LooisTscs
F., July-Aug. 1987, at 112, 114-15.
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cruise missile,"'0 and fighter aircraft engines.12 1 Currently, the
Navy is committed to dual-sourcing the Osprey, and the Army
will dual-source the LHX and all major LHX subsystems. The Air
Force is considering dual-sourcing the ATF, and although details
of the ATA program remain highly classified, the Navy appears
to be committed to dual-sourcing this new system.
1. Advantages of Dual-Sourcing
Proponents of dual-sourcing argue that it produces a variety of
benefits associated with ongoing competition throughout the
production phase. 22 first, the use of dual-sourcing leads to lower
short-run costs and prices to the government because of period-
to-period rivalry among dual-sources. In theory, dual-sourcing
places constant, dynamic pressure on firms to eliminate ineffi-
ciency and pass on these cost savings to DOD in the form of
lower prices. The prospect of losing a significant portion of
annual production orders provides incentives for contractors to
move more aggressively to achieve cost-reducing process innova-
tions and to curb waste than they would under a sole-source
production regime.
Second, by increasing DOD's range of procurement options,
dual-sourcing provides a tool for reducing contractor incentives
to engage in postcontractual opportunism. 2  Private firms
commonly diversify sources of supply to protect themselves against
both accidental and deliberate supply interruptions. 4 Such
diversification is most important when the potential costs of being
120. See Isikoff, Bidding Battle Puts an Ax to Tomahawk Missile's Price, Wash. Post, Apr.
12, 1987, at Hi, col. 1.
121. See R. DzzwEs, TtE AIt FoRCE AND THE GLEAT ENGINE WAR (1987); Behr & Potts,
Pratt Falls in jet Engine Race, Wash. Post. Feb. 12, 1984. at Gi, col. 3.
122. See, e.g., CoMPrrmoN ADvocAwE GEN. OF THE NAVY, THE COMPETMON HANDBOOK
(1987); J. GANSLER, supra note 6. at 185-88; Yuspeh, A Case for Increasing the Use of Competitive
Procurement in the Department of Defense, in BIDDING AND AUCnONING FOI PROCUREMENTr AND
ALLOCATION (Y. Amihud ed. 1976); L. Kratz & J. Gansler. Effective 'Competition During
Weapon System Acquisition (National Contract Management Association) (Dec. 31, 1985)
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
123. For discussions of postcontractual reneging and the appropriation of quasi-rents,
see 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANI-TRUs-r IMPLICATIONS 26-30
(1975); Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. OF ECON. 426, 439-41 (1976);
Klein. Crawford & Alchian, supra note 116.
124. See Haddock. Basing-Point Pricing: Competitive vs. Collusive Theories, 72 Am. ECON.
REv. 289, 292-93 (1982).
Vol. 6: 249, 1989
Weapons Acquisition Policy
cut off are high. " For example, it is likely that the Navy's
commitment to dual-sourcing has stemmed significantly from its
experiences with suppliers that used sole-source positions to gain
what the Navy saw as unwarranted increases in the original
contract price as a condition for continuing work on essential
programs. 26
These first two benefits highlight a key feature of successful
applications of dual-sourcing. In many instances the government's
negotiating position is weakened by its inability to use credible
threats to shift sources of supply.'" Therefore, it may be rational
for DOD to make relatively large initial expenditures early in a
program to ensure that it has the option of making credible
threats to shift production to another source if it encounters
increased prices or opportunistic behavior. Without plausible
alternative sources of supply, strategies used to blunt "supply
hostage" situations are ineffective.
A third possible benefit of dual-sourcing is lower long-run costs
obtained through faster rates of learning-by-doing. Maintaining
competition during production may speed firms' movement on the
learning curve: costs incurred in a dual-sourced program will fall
over time more rapidly as the competing firms try to cut costs
aggressively to secure a larger share of the following year's
purchases than costs in programs with only a single contractor.
The potential benefits of competition in this framework are
manifested either in an increase in the slope of the learning
curve or a reduction in the level of costs on early units pro-
duced. " By spurring greater contractor efforts to reduce costs,
competition cuts costs more rapidly than sole-sourcing.
The fourth benefit from dual-sourcing is the creation of
incentives to improve the quality of systems under production. 2 1
The existence of a rival producer may lead a firm to work harder
125. An example of such high costs is the strategic disadvantage the country might
face when the completion of a vital addition to its weapons inventory is delayed.
126. Patrick Tyler's study of the Navy's nuclear submarine program has suggested
that General Dynamics used its position as a sole-source supplier on the Trident missile
submarine program to obtain a higher price for attack submarines the company was
building for the Navy. P. TYLER, supra note 6, at 167-248; See also J. LErutm, JR., supra
note 6, at 196-227. In addition to eliciting greater adherence to established timetables,
discouraging this and other forms of opportunism may benefit DOD by raising the morale
of government procurement personnel weary of dealing with "unresponsive" contractors.
127. See L. Kratz & J. Gansler, supra note 122, at 1-4 to 1-6.
128. See F. ScHEaRa, supra note 22, at 119-26. The Navy's experience on the
Tomahawk cruise missile program is a good example of this. See Pyatt. supra note 60.
129. See Waskul, supra note 83, at 328.
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to reduce quality deficiencies in production and to devise weapon
system enhancements at lower cost. Creating a second source also
can give the purchasing service valuable insurance against supply
interruptions when the original source encounters production-
related quality problems that place the delivery of satisfactory
equipment in doubt.'
Fifth, by helping maintain a sufficient number of contractors
with relevant design experience and expertise, dual-sourcing may
afford DOD an array of possible contractors to provide alternative
technical approaches for future programs and may assist in
preserving adequate surge capacity to accommodate sharply
increased demands for arms in times of war. Sustaining two
production lines is one way to increase the probability that a
greater number of firms will have the design and systems
integration capability necessary to participate in future competi-
tions and to increase production at the outbreak of war. Indeed,
some services see the latter aims as so important that they are
willing to sacrifice some production efficiencies to maintain the
industrial base and future diversity in design approaches.'
Sixth, dual-sourcing provides a means to avoid the burdensome
disclosure and oversight requirements of the Truth in Negotia-
130. In 1987 the Air Force decided to establish Rockwell as a second source to
Northrop on the MX missile's guidance unit after discovering serious quality control
deficiencies and production delays in Northrop's assembly operations. The Air Force chose
to create a second source even though it plans to buy a total of only 239 of the guidance
units. See Cushman, Northrop's Struggle with the MX, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1987, § 3 at 1,
col. 4; Moore, MX Reliability in Question, supra note 2.
131. Some commentators have said that interservice rivalry within DOD has led the
services to sustain a level of industry capacity that exceeds genuine national requirements
and to engage in wasteful duplication of weapon systems. See, e.g., PL HAuLOw, supra note
6, at 144-75. As one means of preventing the services from maintaining excess capacity and
pursuing needless duplication of individual system capabilities, several members of Congress
have introduced legislation to create a central DOD purchasing authority that would acquire
arms on behalf of the individual services. See Morrison, supra note 20, at 2178. Opponents
of such measures have argued that a central procurement organization would tend to
overlook legitimate needs of each service. More generally, some observers have contended
that interservice rivalry yields net benefits to society because it ensures that the poor
judgment of one purchasing service does not preclude the development of promising
weapon designs or the adoption of useful, overlapping systems by another service. See
Concurring Statement of Dr. George J. Stigler, in Frrziiuit COMMiSSION, supra note 1, at 198.
Some measure of functional redundancy may be valuable as insurance against the failure
of any single approach to solving a problem. For example, it was initially believed that the
operation of the space shuttle would render production of nonreusable launch vehicles
largely unnecessary. In the aftermath of the Challenger disaster, substantial continued
output of unmanned rockets has come to be recognized as a crucial hedge against problems
with the space shuttle. See Sawyer, Air Force Braces as Pace of Unmanned Space Launches Soars,
Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1988, at A4, col. 1.
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tions Act.' The statute permits DOD to waive the requirement
that contractors provide cost or pricing data if, among other
grounds, the contract price is based on "adequate price competi-
tion."'3 In some circumstances dual-sourcing may stimulate a level
of price competition sufficient to satisfy this standard.'" Abandon-
ing the disclosure duty and its related oversight requirements
would remove a substantial and costly administrative burden from
the shoulders of the contractor and DOD alike."s5
Seventh, as is true with teaming arrangements, dual-sourcing
can yield private political benefits to contractors that, while
offering little in the way of cost savings, may appeal to pur-
chasing officials and Congress.' Allocating production contracts
to a larger number of states and congressional districts can
broaden the base of congressional support and provide greater
political protection if a weapon system is threatened with cutbacks
or termination." Dual-sourcing also can help generate public and
congressional support for defense expenditures by suggesting that
because defense contractors are exposed to the same types of
132. Pub L. No. 87-653, 76 Stat. 528 (1962) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §
2306a (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
133. Id. § 2306a(b). For conventional negotiated contract awards, the contractor
provides the government's negotiation team with a substantial body of information to
support its proposed price. The existence of adequate price competition supplies a basis for
waiving the requirement that such data be provided. Thus, in some instances, dual-sourcing
would permit the government and the contractor to dispense with one major stage of
disclosure and review.
134. Some accounts of the Justice Department's Ill Wind investigation suggest that
collusion between rivals for new systems is one focus of the inquiry. See supra note 3.
Fragmentary reports of the inquiry have indicated that some contractors may have agreed
to submit noncompetitive bids in return for promises of subcontracting work from their
rivals. The ultimate soundness of these allegations surely would influence the desirability
of retaining cost and pricing observation by DOD.
135. The size and scope of DOD regulatory structures designed in large part to
compensate for the absence of effective market-based constraints is staggering. See J.
GANSLER, supra note 6, at 150-54; Augustine, Defense: A Case of Too Many Cooks, FORTUNE., Dec.
15, 1988, at 219; CENTER FOR SRATEIC AND INT'L S'ruDiEs, supra note 6, at 29-30; Fossedal,
More Audits Won't Curb Defense Waste, Wall St. J., June 30, 1986, at 22, col. 3.
136. See Morrison, supra note 117, at 3203. See also supra note 93 and accompanying
text. As is the case with the potential political consequences of teaming, the political
"benefits" of dual-sourcing may be wholly private to the firms holding production contracts.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text. Social utility, for example, may be reduced if the
splitting of an award increases the program's political appeal but diverts a portion of total
production to an inferior firm.
137. For example, recent scholarship has suggested that prime contractors rely heavily
on expansive geographic distribution of subcontracts to maximize a program's political
appeal. See Mayer, Patterns of Congressional Influence in Defense Contracting, in AiLms, Poi.nics,
AmD nILE coNoMY, supra note 1; see also N. Krz, supra note 6.
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constraints that confront companies operating in commercial
markets, taxpayers are receiving their money's worth.
2. Disadvantages of Dual-Sourcing
a. Specific Disadvantages
Despite its potential significant benefits, dual-sourcing also
entails formidable costs."' Prominent among these are costs
associated with the technology transfers that dual-sourcing
strategies typically require."" Technical data packages, including
voluminous technical specifications and blueprints, must be
prepared, exchanged, interpreted, and implemented. The efficient
transfer of such information often requires that the developing
party cooperate fully in giving the recipient firm knowledge that
the developing party gained in creating and applying the data.140
Because a firm's design data and related practical knowledge
frequently are among its most important assets, such cooperation
may only be given grudgingly, if at all. Failure to achieve an
acceptable level of cooperation may delay the establishment of a
second source and may result in quality deficiencies as the
recipient of another firm's data attempts to apply the data by trial
and error. In many cases, the receiving firm will replicate the
developing firm's errors.' In addition, as is the case with
teaming, technologically progressive firms may devote fewer
138. See, e.g., Greer & iUao. Competitive Weapon Systems Procurement: A Summn.a and
Evaluation of Recent Research, 17 NAT'L Cop'r. MGoar. J. 37 (1984).
139. See Halloran, Navy Asks G.E. to Share Contract N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1984, at Dl,
col. 1 (discussing transfer of data from General Electric to Pratt & Whitney to enable Pratt
& Whitney to become second source for General Electric's F-404 engine).
140. Communicating "know-how" or "show-how" information sometimes entails
relocating some of the developing party's technical personnel in the recipient party's plant
to advise the recipient's design and industrial engineers.
141. See K. Aacitsmu, supra note 16, at 26 (discussing costs of transferring production
technology). Public accounts of the Navy's efforts to replace the wings of its older A-6
aircraft underscore the transaction costs associated with the types of compulsory data
transfers that dual-sourcing requires. After receiving competing bids fbr the wing
replacement program from Boeing and Grumman (the original manufacturer of the A-6),
the Navy awarded the contract to Boeing in 1985. To design the replacement wing so that
it fit the A-6, Boeing first had to obtain thousands of blueprints from Grumman. Officials
from the Navy and Boeing later claimed that Grumman deliberately delayed the delivery
of necessary drawings, causing the project to lag substantially behind schedule. Boeing had
to send a series of teams of technicians to Grumman's Long Island facilities to speed the
transfer of the blueprints. Carley, Contractor's Mishaps in New Technology Made the Navy Seethe,
Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
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resources to research and development as they contemplate a
forced transfer of the fruits of their work to another firm.
A second category of expenses consists of fixed costs that
frequently must be duplicated at a second facility."" Foremost
among these expenses are the nonrecurring costs of equipping
the second source with the tooling required to build the system
and with testing devices to ensure quality. After the second source
obtains the necessary capital assets, some administrative fixed costs
such as program-specific management, inspection, and reporting
systems will also be replicated within the organization of the
second-source contractor."'
A third type of expenses involves administrative costs. Dual-
sourcing typically can impose higher levels of certain administra-
tive costs on the purchasing authority. For the DOD program
office and the program manager, dual-sourcing strategies
ordinarily require more time and effort to plan and oversee than
sole-source purchasing arrangements.I" These additional adminis-
trative expenditures also occur early in the program life cycle
when managers feel bound to reduce outlays lest higher costs
expose the program to attack from rival programs and their
constituencies. As it implements a dual-sourcing program, the
acquiring service must increase staffing to monitor the financial
performance and quality control of two or more producers rather
than a single contractor. On the whole, conceiving and carrying
out a dual-sourcing strategy also may force risk-averse DOD
managers to make harder decisions and exercise greater responsi-
bility than they would prefer.
A further source of difficulty is the assumption that rivalry
between two sources for annual production awards will drive both
firms to reduce costs. This assumption may not always be
accurate. Although the development of a new weapon system
usually presents neither the industrial setting nor the product
142. Industry officials have warned that extensive use of compulsory data exchanges
will diminish the incentives of individual firms to innovate and to spend their own resources
on research and development. See Beltramo. supra note 83. The definition of the
government's rights in data related to public contracts is an ongoing matter of contention
between DOD and its suppliers. See Logistics Management Inst., The Department of Defense
and Rights in Technical Data, in PACKARD COMMISSION. supra note 1. Appendix at 111-51.
143. See F. SCERER., supra note 22, at 127; K. ARcimAw, supra note 16, at 26-27.
144. Careful attention to quality control is especially important if DOD is to obtain
systems from both sources that are interchangeable for purposes of operations and
maintenance.
145. See K. ARcimU.um, supra note 16, at 17-20, 27-28.
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characteristics most conducive to successful collusion, some firms
may attempt to collude explicitly or tacitly to set higher prices.",
A more significant concern arises from the possibility that DOD
may need to guarantee each contractor a minimum annual share
of production-for example, a minimum of twenty-five percent-to
convince it to incur program-specific costs. 47 Rather than bid
aggressively, some firms might be satisfied with being a high-cost
producer of a lesser share of annual awards s.14  In addition, when
DOD attempts to induce a contractor to bid for a share of an
ongoing program that was previously a single supplier's domain,
146. The potential for collusion generally is believed greatest when, among other
conditions, the products in question are comparatively undifferentiated, there is a large
number of small buyers, and transactions are frequent. See F. ScHmERt, INDUSTRM. MARir
STrucTuRE ANo ECONOMIC PERFomANcE 169-228 (2d ed. 1980); G. STIrLER, THE OaRGoWm&zxoN
Or INDUSTRY 39-45 (1968); Asch & Seneca, Characteristics of Collusive Finns, 23 J. INDus. ECON.
223 (1975); Clark, Price-Fiing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices
After Ethyl Corp., 1983 WIs. L. Rzv. 887, 891-99; Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and
Antitrust Law, 67 CoaNzu, L. Rv. 439, 447-51 (1982). None of these conditions is satisfied
in the competition for major weapons development contracts. Design proposals from rival
contractors are highly differentiated, the purchasing entities (the three armed services) are
formidable and few in number, and new weapons development contracts are awarded
infrequently. See F. ScHEREP, supra at 201; J. GANSLER, supra note 6, at 183-84; Burnett, supra
note 10, at 27-29; Hearings on Competition in Defense Procurement Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Com. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 119, 127-28
(1968) (testimony of F. Scherer). Even after the purchasing service chooses one design for
full production and decides to split production awards between two companies, both firms
usually will have strong incentives to pursue design refinements to incorporate improve-
ments stemming from ongoing research in swifUy moving technological disciplines. As
indicated above, however, an important (and, as yet, unanswered) question arising from
the Justice Department's Ill Wind inquiry is whether direct rivals have colluded regularly
on major .forthcoming programs. See sources cited supra note 19.
147. The need for such a guarantee could arise regardless of when in the production
phase DOD decides to establish a second source. Such commitments probably will be
necessary to induce a firm to bid against an established producer that has enjoyed several
years of experience under a sole-source contract for the system in question. DOD likewise
may need to offer minimum production guarantees even when the entire production run
will be dual-sourced and no single supplier will enjoy a learning advantage. Without the
guarantees, suppliers in the latter situation may decline to invest their own funds in the
development and prototyping efforts that would precede the award of production contracts.
148. To diminish such complacency, DOD would need the ability to reduce a lethargic
second source's share to zero in any one year, yet this may reduce the pool of firms willing
to participate in dual-sourcing programs. See J. Anton & D. Yao, Split Awards, Procurement,
and Innovation (Research Paper No. 293) (Aug. 1987) (discussing possible outcomes under
split-award and winner-take-all auctions) (on file with authors). Whether a firm would
choose such a strategy depends in part on the magnitude of learning-by-doing effects. If
a firm consistently wins the smaller share of annual awards, it may find itself at an
increasing cost disadvantage over time if learning effects are large and its rival significantly
lowers cost by accumulating output.
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the potential second source is likely to face information asymme-
tries that could yield perverse bidding results.14
A fifth difficulty is that the "savings" that DOD seeks from
competition between two producers may not consist solely, or
even predominantly, of contractor efforts to eliminate waste and
inefficiency. Instead, contractors may reduce overall program costs
by gradually liquidating, among other units of the firm, organiza-
tions that contain the companies' technical expertise.' If this
scenario occurs, short-term cost savings will come at the cost of
long-term ability to produce qualitatively superior new systems, as
DOD in effect reduces the financial returns defense firms
previously have realized for innovation. 5' This could have serious
149. By virtue of its production experience to date, an established supplier of a given
system ordinarily possesses private information about its true costs. Notwithstanding its
auditing and information gathering powers, DOD may find it difficult to obtain such data
in order to enable the second source to make sound cost estimates. See Anton & Yao,
Second Sourcing and the Experience Curve: Price Competition in Defense Procurement, 18 RAND J.
Ecow. 57 (1987); Tirole, Procurement and Renegotiation, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 235, 240-41 (1986).
DOD has tried a number of methods to give potential follow-on bidders a solid basis for
estimating the cost of building a system currently produced by a sole-source contractor. See,
e.g., Elliott, The Navj in 1987, U.S. NAVAL INst. PRoc., May 1988, at 146, 156 (describing
how Navy gave Tenneco's Newport News shipyard contract to overhaul Trident missile
submarine to give Newport News better idea of what it would cost to build Trident vessel
in competition with General Dynamics, the system's sole-source supplier). In the face of
production cost information asymmetries, some potential second sources will submit highly
cautious bids that exceed the prices DOD already pays to the original producer. Others may
err in the other direction and mistakenly bid too low. Excessively low bids may generate
overruns, forcing the second source to seek further payments from DOD to finish the
contract. In addition, the original producer may choose to engage in limit pricing. Although
this may be a better outcome for the purchasing service than unrestrained monopoly (more
specifically, bilateral monopoly or oligopoly) pricing, it highlights the limited effectiveness
of some forms of dual-sourcing. Significant benefits may be deferred until the second source
accumulates sufficient aggregate production to compete "effectively" with the original sole-
source. In a procurement environment in which programs often are terminated earlier
than originally planned, anticipated dual-sourcing benefits may not be achieved.
150. Defense industry analysts predict that some firms may react to DOD's dual-
sourcing policies by declining to seek future defense contracts and focusing their attention
on commercial markets. These analysts suggest that companies that lack attractive
commercial options will continue to compete for new contract awards but will gradually
liquidate their technical organizations. See Stevenson, supra note 10.
151. See W. RooztsoN, supra note 40 (analyzing impact of DOD profit policies upon
incentives to innovate); Morrison, supra note 83, at 1783 (quoting Lockheed chairman
Lawrence Kitchen as stating that DOD presently is forcing contractors to "cost-share in
development programs and to absorb added risks without opportunity for commensurate
reward"); see also Goldberg, supra note 123, at 432-36 (discussing role of limits on entry
in eliciting optimal amount of service in regulated industries).
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adverse implications for U.S. defense policy, which places a
premium on technological superiority.52
A sixth problem is that the production of such technologically
complex products as airframes and related electronics systems may
be subject to technology-based economies of scale. Given unavoid-
ably high fixed costs, the reduction of output rates per period
resulting from split purchases can impede the exploitation of
technology-based economies and may force producers to operate
at higher average and marginal costs. In essence, dual-source
firms may operate on higher short-run average cost curves, along
a declining long-run average cost curve, than would a single firm.
Dual-sourcing, therefore, is less attractive when there are econo-
mies of scale and annual unit purchases are small.
A seventh difficulty is that under some conditions dual-
sourcing's learning-related benefits may not materialize. Under
dual-sourcing, each producer typically will build fewer total units
than a single producer and consequently will accumulate total
production at a slower rate. Each doubling of output takes
longer. Thus, for dynamic cost considerations, both the annual
rate of output and anticipated total system purchase quantities
determine the cost effectiveness of dual-sourcing. Small annual
DOD purchases and limited total purchases render dual-sourcing
less attractive as a cost-reduction device. The tradeoffs between
these effects depend on the nature of the underlying technologies
and production processes. Given a set of planned annual buys
and total lifetime production runs, dual-sourcing may make sense
for some systems or components but not for others.
b. Long-Term Trends Disadvantageous to Dual-Sourcing
Focusing on the importance of both the rate of output and
length of the production run reduces confidence that future
funding and military requirements actually will result in expected
production levels. Experience with past and present programs
shows that actual requirements and purchases often fall below
early plans. Costs rise, requirements change, and funding may not
152. See Biting the Bullet-Defense Chief Carlucci Aims for Economy and Quality, BAARON'S,
Apr. 4, 1988, at 70, col. 2 (DOD Secretary Carlucci: "Our advantage is in technology, and
if we fail to modernize we give up our advantage. Certainly we can't match the Soviets in
quantity . . .); 1989 DOD ANN. FiscAL REP., supra note 5, at 64-65; U.S. OfficE oF
TEcHNoWoy ASssmsMENr, TuE DENsE TEciNOLOGY BASE: IwNooucroN Ao Ovuvlgw-A SPECIAL
REPowr 3 (Mar. 1988).
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materialize. Indeed, a central feature of the weapons acquisition
process is uncertainty, both internal and external to the procure-
ment process."'
Rising costs and budgetary pressures are unlikely to allow
procurement in the 1990s at rates the services are now projecting.
In each of the last five years, Congress has appropriated funds
at levels below Reagan Administration budget requests, 54 and it
is very doubtful that the real growth in defense spending that
occurred in the early to mid-1980s will soon be repeated. 5 Thus,
purchase plans based on projected annual increases in real
defense spending almost certainly will not be realized. Even
DOD's recent budget requests have shown significant cuts for the
coming years. 50
A further complication arises from current plans for a signifi-
cant number of "big-ticket" projects to come on-line at about the
same time in the mid-1990s. The new systems include the ATF,
ATA, LHX, Osprey, the B-2 bomber, a new attack submarine, and
two new nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. If annual purchases
decline from currently anticipated levels, mandatory dual-sourcing
becomes a less attractive tool for cost-reduction. "Stretch-out" of
system purchases likewise works against dual-sourcing. Costs are
immediate and often large. Benefits are chiefly delayed and
uncertain and therefore must be discounted. Even if cost-benefit
calculations based on current projections of both annual and total
purchases indicate that dual-sourcing will yield positive returns,
153. See M. PEcv & F. ScsHaEa. supra note 22, at 17-54; Burnett, supra note 10, at
19-20.
154. See, e.g., Wilson & Kenworthy, Panel Adds to Pentagon Budget Cuts, Wash. Post,
Apr. 28, 1987, at AS, col. 1.
155. See Cushman, A Little Here, a Little There Is Not the Carlucci Style, N.Y. Times, Apr.
3, 1988, at ES, col. 1; Moore, Defense Department in Fiscal Retreat: "Where Are We Headed?"
Wash. Post, Jan. 6. 1988, at A21, col. 1; Milita Services Ordered to Cut Budgets $30 Billion,
Wash. Post. Dec. 5, 1987, at AS, col. 5; Moore, Carlucci Inherits a Pentagon Facing Bleakest
Months of the Reagan Era, Wash. Post, Nov. 6. 1987, at A14, col. 4. Carrington, The
Pentagon's Spending Specialists Boldly Go Where Congress Isn't Remotely Likely to Follow, Wall St.
J., Aug. 21, 1987, at 38, col. 1.
156. In its fiscal year 1988 five-year defense plan, DOD requested a total of $1,061
billion in total budget authority for 1988-90. Its fiscal year 1988 request for 1988-90 fell
to $970 billion, and Congress is likely to reduce that amount further. See Wilson, Army
Facing $100 Billion Shortfall, Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1986, at Al, col. 1; see also Wilson, Carlucci
Hasn't Planned for Worst-Case Cuts, Wash. Post, Mar. 11, 1988, at A25, col. 1; Carrington,
Grumman A-6F Work Is Among Projects Militaty Will Drop to Meet Budget Cuts, Wall St. J., Dec.
16, 1987, at 30, col. 1; Morrison, supra note 117, at 3200.
Yale Journal on Regulation
schedule stretch-outs could reverse the result by deferring
uncertain benefits further into the future.'57
It is hardly obvious that dual-sourcing of the aircraft systems
discussed above makes economic sense from a cost-saving
perspective. For example, the LHX program, which is now in
the design phase, currently mandates dual-sourcing for all major
systems and subsystems. 58 With LHX production at least six years
away, it seems ill-advised to predicate the program's entire
structure upon dual-sourcing-notably, by requiring teaming that
anticipates mandatory dual-sourcing for full production-if cost
reduction is the overriding aim. Moreover, there is already signifi-
cant doubt that LHX purchases ever will reach anticipated
levels."5 9
Because the LHX is expected to be purchased in relatively
large quantities, some of its systems may be candidates for dual-
sourcing on cost grounds. However, the cost-reduction potential
for the other programs is more questionable because they will
produce aircraft in far smaller numbers. The Air Force expects
to buy approximately 750 ATF units, and it plans to purchases
approximately 900 Osprey units with maximum annual purchases
of 132. The number of ATAs to be purchased has been estimated
at 450. Dual-sourcing weapon systems that will be purchased in
157. The significant uncertainties inherent in the weapons acquisition process suggest
that a relatively high discount rate is appropriate. Recent Army cutbacks in a number of
major programs indicate the extent to which purchases may be trimmed. The Army now
plans to buy 6882 Bradley Fighting Vehicles rather than the planned 11,519. It has
proposed scaling back purchases of the Apache attack helicopter from 1031 to 593, and has
suggested trimming its total acquisition of the Blackhawk transport helicopter from 1775
units to 1107. The Multiple Launch Rocket System will be bought at low annual rates (44
per year), and the total purchase will be 681 rather than the originally estimated 1381. See
Donnelly, Army Plans to Sacrifice Weapons in Wake of Shrinking Budgets, Defense News, Mar.
16, 1987, at 9. Congress, however, may require additional purchases above those requested
by the Army. See Donnelly. Programs Hit Snag in Subpanel Markups, Defense News, Apr. 6,
1987, at 1, col. 3.
158. See supra text accompanying note 73.
159. See U.S. GN. ACCouMING OffICE, IssurS CONCERNING TIlE ARMv'S LIGHT HE.LICOv.R
FAMILY PROGRAM (May 1986); Army Again Changes IHX Acquisition Plan, AvIATION WEEK &
SpAgc Tmai., Apr. 20, 1987, at 24. In 1987 the Army announced that it had cut its
anticipated LHX buy from 5000 to 4168. The Army previously had estimated maximum
annual buys of 480-500 LHX units for the late 1990s. At current unit cost estimates (which
the General Accounting Office doubts will be achieved), 480 units per year at a fleet
average cost of $5.3 million could cost roughly $2.35 billion. This exceeded the Reagan
Administration's 1987 budget request for all Army rotary wing aircraft plus modification of
all Army aircraft in every year from 1986-89. In February 1988, DOD announced that it
now anticipates "a future production requirement of about 2000 LHXs." See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1988, at 26, col. I (late edition) (reporting Army move to halve its previously
planned $66 billion program to purchase of 4168 LHX units).
Vol. 6: 249, 1989
Weapons Acquisition Policy
such limited quantities cannot likely be justified on cost
grounds.160 For these programs, a rational decision to dual-source
must rest on other grounds, such as sustaining an adequate
number of independent design centers to ensure a diversity of
technical approaches for future programs or to maintain the
country's mobilization base.
3. A Balanced Approach to Dual-Sourcing
Dual-sourcing, like teaming, presents a variety of potential costs
and benefits. Although each system that is considered as a
candidate for dual-sourcing must be evaluated individually, taking
into account the particular characteristics of the program and
feasible alternative strategies, several generalizations are possible.
Dual-sourcing to minimize costs makes economic sense only when
purchases are expected to be reasonably large and will be made
over a number of years. It is unjustifiable on cost grounds to
dual-source expensive systems that will be built either in small
numbers each year or in small numbers over the life of the
program. Under low output conditions, the anticipated benefits of
securing period-to-period competition-driving costs down in both
the short-run and in the long-run-will seldom, if ever, offset the
sacrifice in duplicated costs and lost learning that results from
splitting the purchase of the system. Thus, if cost savings is the
overriding criterion, dual-sourcing should be used only in two
manners-as the procurement method for high-volume programs,
and as a selective tool for ameliorating a longstanding pattern of
irresponsible behavior by a sole-source supplier.
It is true that noncost rationales for dual-sourcing and teaming
sometimes may justify the higher costs that these strategies can
entail. Indeed, many of the perceived noncost benefits of dual-
sourcing and teaming discussed above reasonably may be viewed
160. It is possible that the number of each system could increase. The Navy believes
that the Osprey has potential commercial applications. It also seems possible, in light of
anticipated tight DOD budgets, that the Navy could purchase a "navalized" version of the
ATF, and the Air Force a version of the ATA. Should this occur, and should the additional
units of each be similar enough to systems already under production, the rationale for dual-
sourcing becomes stronger as both single-year purchases and the total production run
increase. See, e.g., Kennedy, U.S. Naval Aircraft and Missile Development in 1986, U.S. NAVAL
INsT. Paoc., May 1987, at 80. Nonetheless, for the ATF and the ATA, it seems unlikely that
either would be produced in sufficient numbers annually to warrant dual-sourcing. In the
case of the ATF, this view is reinforced by the fact that a "navalized" version of the aircraft
would require significant system changes and therefore would have little in common with
the Air Force variant.
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as insuring against the possibility of failure. Having two sources
ensures that if one producer allows costs to rise unacceptably,
another supplier can be called upon to step in. Dual-sourcing also
provides a ready producer if a catastrophe were to eliminate one
supplier.' Teaming to maintain technical capability similarly
insures against the inability of any one design team to meet
military threats in the future. Thus, teaming and dual-sourcing
sometimes may be rational acquisition strategies even when they
are more costly. Yet DOD seldom emphasizes these noncost
concerns as justifications for teaming and dual-sourcing. Rather,
the purchasing services have preferred to stress their cost-saving
and price-reducing possibilities. Rational selection of any procure-
ment technique requires more explicit consideration of cost and
noncost objectives, as well as a careful determination of precisely
which goals support the choice of a given strategy.'62
IV. A Comprehensive Approach to Competition Policy in
Weapons Acquisition
DOD's current acquisition policies have two desirable objectives:
the use of rivalry to elicit better supplier performance, and the
preservation of an essential level of industry design and manufac-
turing capability. There appears to be a narrow, almost single-
minded focus on dual-sourcing as the best method of achieving
competition and, secondarily, of sustaining capability. In several
significant cases, dual-sourcing is unlikely to achieve the rivalry-
driven performance goals DOD hopes to attain.65 Only noncost
considerations can justify such procedures for programs with
small-to-modest anticipated production runs.
Several features of the existing emphasis on teaming arrange-
ments raise similar concerns. The emergence of overlapped team
members and the use of teaming arrangements as the foundations
161. See, e.g., Wilford, Shortage of Rocket Fuel Creating New Crsis for U.S. Space Flights,
N.Y. Times. June 8, 1988, at Al, col. 5 (discussing consequences of explosion that destroyed
one of two U.S. facilities for manufacturing critical ingredient of solid rocket fuel).
162. Rivalry itself may be viewed as a means of insuring against the possibility that
other control mechanisms, such as auditing and cost observation, may fail. Using rivalry in
addition to other regulatory controls may reduce the risk that other controls will fail to
hold costs in check.
163. Recent proposals--ultimately abandoned--to dual-source the Northrop B-2
bomber (with an estimated total production run of 132 aircraft) would have been
unsupportable on cost savings grounds. See Cushman, Stealth-Project Competition Rejected, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1987, at DI, col. 3.
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for dual-sourcing pose serious problems for the programs
examined in this Article. These trends are so prone to conflicting
interests that the difficulties that beset any teaming arrangement
or joint venture, particularly problems associated with accomplish-
ing an efficient two-way flow of data and know-how, may become
crippling impediments to acceptable performance.
The potential costs and risks of dual-sourcing and teaming
have not received adequate consideration in congressional and
DOD evaluations of program structures for acquiring existing and
forthcoming weapon systems. This deficiency appears to stem both
from a failure to give full consideration to alternative approaches
to accomplishing competition-related objectives and from weak-
nesses in the existing institutional processes through which
competition plans are formulated and implemented. This Part
outlines a range of options that purchasing authorities should
consider in devising a competition strategy for any given system.
It then uses the LHX program to demonstrate how this acquisi-
tion program would have evolved if Congress and DOD had
acknowledged the shortcomings of teaming and dual-sourcing
discussed above. This Part concludes by proposing adjustments in
the decisionmaking process that would lead to sounder judgments
about the desirability of each option for individual programs.
A. Alternative Competition Strategies
Dual-sourcing will not necessarily result in competitive prices,
and a narrow focus on dual-sourcing obscures other potentially
less costly methods for achieving the services' cost and noncost
goals. 1'8 Dual-sourcing should be viewed as one of several means
for affording DOD a range of supplier options sufficient to ensure
cost discipline and seller responsiveness by causing contractors to
view the weapons markets they serve as subject to credible
challenge by other suppliers.
1. Funding Capability Directly
DOD could fund the technical organizations of valued contrac-
tors to sustain the capability of a critical mass of suppliers and
thereby preserve its purchasing options and a diversity of design
164. See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 10, at 29-34.
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approaches. 8 Direct funding of technical capability can take
several forms, including contracts for specific research and
development projects or contracts to construct prototypes.'"
Under such a system, DOD would pay contractors to keep their
engineering teams intact to compete for future program awards.
This approach appears to be partly responsible for Lockheed's
emergence as a major force in the manufacturing and integration
of fighter aircraft systems in the late 1970s and early 1980s, well
after its F-104 assembly line closed in 1967.167
Developing prototypes also can yield benefits beyond maintain-
ing contractor capability to compete for future program awards.
Even when DOD ultimately declines to undertake full production,
the possibility that DOD might order full production based on
prototype tests can constrain the pricing discretion of sole-source
suppliers on closely related programs.6 8  In 1985, Northrop
offered to sell the Air Force 396 F-20 fighter aircraft under a
firm fixed-price contract for $15 million per airplane."6 Northrop
had built three F-20 prototypes largely at its own expense, and
it hoped to convince the Air Force to buy the F-20 as a partial
substitute for General Dynamics's F-16. General Dynamics re-
sponded by offering the Air Force a modified F-16 for $13.5
165. This approach is suggested in J. Fox, supra note 22, at 470. To some extent,
DOD presently funds technical capability directly by reimbursing contractors for certain
independent research and development (IR&D) expenditures. DOD's funding of IR&D
outlays is described and evaluated in U.S. OffiCE oF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENTI, supra note 152,
at 47-51.
166. This approach essentially would entail greater reliance on DOD programs
presently in place. In fiscal year 1987, DOD awarded $21.8 billion in research contracts to
profit and nonprofit entities. See Black, McDonnell Douglas Tops Research List, Wash. Post,
Mar. 31, 1988, at BI, col. 6; see also Pollack, Sematech's Wearj Hunt for a Chief, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 1, 1988, at DI, col. 3 (discussing DOD funding for consortium of U.S. firms to
perform semiconductor research).
167. To maintain design capability other than by teaming and dual-sourcing, DOD
could enter into research/design contracts with defense firms, without anticipation of major
production contracts. DOD essentially would pay a contractor to keep its design team intact.
From 1967 until the late 1970s, Lockheed had no major aircraft production contract.
Lockheed's design team, however, was maintained and its capability preserved in part
through development and low-level production on the U-2, TR-I, and SR-71 reconnaissance
aircraft. See Harris, Back from the Brink, Lockheed Shows Signs of Prospering Again, Wall St. J.,
May 12, 1983, at 1, col. 6. In the late 1970s. the Air Force awarded Lockheed a contract
to produce a top secret stealth fighter called the F-117A. Lockheed has delivered over 50
of these aircraft to the Air Force. See Wilson, Secrecy's Veil Lifted from "Stealth" Jet, Wash.
Post, Nov. 11, 1988, at AS, col. 1.
168. See Burnett, supra note 10, at 31.
169. See Hiatt, Northrop Offers Lower-Cost Fighter in Bid for Some Air Force Business, Wash.
Post, Apr. 5, 1985, at A6, col. 2.
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million each, about $6 million less than the fully equipped version
of the aircraft. 7
2. Extend and Upgrade Existing Systems
Most weapon systems are durable goods with useful lives of
twenty years or more.' A second general method for sustaining
capability and stimulating competition is to upgrade existing
systems rather than to purchase new systems.'" With respect to
aircraft procurement, DOD sometimes can defer beginning a new
program by modernizing existing aircraft.' This approach may
offer competitive options and sustain capability at costs less than
those associated with dual-sourcing. 7 Contracts to refurbish and
to refit aircraft also can be allocated to sustain desired levels of
capability across firms.
3. Employ Close Substitutes
DOD might obtain lower prices for a sole-sourced system by
threatening to use a close substitute that mirrors the system's
170. See Carrington & Harris, Northrop's Tigershark Continues Uphill Fight, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 7, 1985, at 6, col. 1; Duke, Pentagon Gets Cut-Rate Offer for F-16Jets, Wall St. J., June
21. 1985. at 4, col. 2.
171. For example, between 1955 and 1979 McDonnell Douglas built over 5000 F-4
fighter aircraft. Thousands of F-4s remain in service in the inventories of the United States
and its ames. See B. YENNE, McDONNELL DourlAs: A TALK OF Two Gtrs 212-17 (1985).
Similarly, over 200 B-52 bombers remain in service in the U.S. Air Force even though
Boeing completed the last of these aircraft in 1962. See 1989 DOD ANN. FiscAL Rzr., supra
note 5, at 236-38.
172. The capacity of recycled or reconditioned durable goods to constrain the pricing
discretion of original equipment manufacturers is treated in Swan, Alcoa: The Influence of
Recycling on Monopoly Power, 88 J. Po. ECoN. 76 (1980); Gaskins, Alcoa Rwisitet The Welfare
Implications of a Secondhand Market, 7 J. ECON. TaroEv 254 (1974); Fisher, Alcoa Revisite-
Comment, 9 J. ECON. TizoRv 357 (1974).
173. The capabilities of existing aircraft can be increased by adding new engines,
upgrading electronics systems, and replacing fatigued structures. See, e.g., Friedman, First
F-14A(Plus) Is Delivered U.S. NAVAL INST. PRoc., Feb. 1988, at 120 (discussing improvements
to F-14 aircraft built in early 1970s).
174. See Burnett, supra note 10, at 32-33; M. Rich & E. Dews, supra note 54, at 44-
45. In the course of deciding how to modernize its fleet of strategic bombers, it appears
possible that the Air Force used the option of upgrading or extending production of
Rockwell's B-I bomber to pressure Northrop to improve its performance on the B-2
program. See Will the B-IB Win the Battle of the Bombers?, Bus. Wwt, Nov. 5, 1984, at 68;
Wilson, Firm Offers Price Cut on 48 More BI Bombers, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 1986, at AS, col.
5; Beazley, Rockwell Girds for Showdown on B-I Bomber, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1985, at 6, col.
1.
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capabilities. 7 DOD has used this substitution strategy to gain
price reductions for jet engines used in F-15 and F-16 aircraft . 7
Similarly, purchasing services occasionally can use a mix of two
dissimilar systems as an acceptable substitute for purchasing a new
multi-role system. The Navy appears to have applied this strategy
successfully when it used the threat of increased purchases of
Grumman's F-14 and A-6 aircraft to induce McDonnell Douglas
to reduce the price of the F/A-18.'" This demonstrates that a
purchasing service may be able to confront its suppliers with
credible substitution scenarios by pointing to weapons within its
own inventory. This obviates the need to resort to less persuasive
threats of acquiring a somewhat dissimilar system, or mix of
systems, from another service.'
4. Increase Recourse to Foreign Suppliers
DOD increasingly might look to foreign weapons suppliers to
fulfill some of its needs as a way of constraining the behavior of
domestic suppliers. 79 Past efforts to use this approach have
provoked powerful congressional opposition.8 0 However, one
175. See Burnett, supra note 10, at 31.
176. See sources cited supra note 121.
177. See J. Limw4, JR., supra note 6, at 229-35; Navy Signs for 168 F/A-18s, 21 AV-
8Bs Worth $5.9 Billion, AvATIoN WZEK & SPACE TwcH., Nov. 28, 1983, at 30; Mossberg, Navy
Is Said to Threaten Cut in Purchases of McDonnell Douglas F-18 Due to Price, Wall St. J., Aug.
3, 1982, at 10, col. 1. During Lehman's tenure as Navy Secretary, the Navy used a similar
substitution approach with Kaman's SH-2 helicopter to induce Sikorsky to reduce costs and
cure production problems on the SH-60 helicopter. J. LEHMAN, JR., supra note 6, at 236-37.
178. Contractors are aware of each service's strong institutional preference for buying
weapons dedicated entirely to that service's particular needs. See R. HALLOm, supra note
6, at 144-75. One service's resistance to adopting a weapon system from another's inventory
is not insurmountable, however. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the Air Force
acquired (albeit unenthusiastically) substantial numbers of A-7 and F-4 aircraft, both of
which originated as Navy programs. Differing service needs and institutional rivalry will
continue to inhibit interservice substitution, although current and foreseeable budget
pressures may make interservice switching threats more credible. A service might be more
inclined to tell its suppliers that they must improve performance or face the prospect that
cost-cutting DOD and congressional leadership will force the service to use a weapon not
of its own choosing.
179. This technique is endorsed in M. WEWnnKAUm, supra note 22, at 83.
180. This opposition rests on two basic concerns. First, there is fear that domestic
firms will suffer a decline in revenues if DOD awards contracts to foreign firms. See
Morrison, Made in America, NAT'L J., Nov. 28, 1988, at 3036. Second, the United States is
believed to have become dangerously dependent on foreign producers for various
components, used to manufacture armaments, such as ball bearings. See Carrington.
Militay's Dependence on Foreign Supplier Causes Rising Concern, Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1988, at
1, col. 6.
298
Vol. 6: 249, 1989
Weapons Acquisition Policy
factor that may temper opposition to foreign purchases is the
stated sentiment among the country's NATO allies that European
nations should reduce or forego purchases of U.S. weapons unless
the United States reduces barriers to the importation of European
weaponry."" The need for the United States and its NATO allies
to get the most from their collective defense outlays by pursuing
common designs and production programs also may reduce resis-
tance to purchases from foreign contractors."' Joint ventures or
teaming arrangements between European and U.S. firms may
provide the best means for foreign companies to establish them-
selves as DOD suppliers without drawing severe congressional
rebuke."'
5. Rely on Data Generated by the Government
For some weapons and weapon components, DOD might
consider relying more extensively upon DOD research centers and
laboratories to perform research and development tasks and to
generate data to be used in acquisition programs.8 4 Perhaps the
best model for such an approach is the Naval Weapons Center at
China Lake, California. The China Lake facility was responsible
for developing the highly successful Sidewinder air-to-air missile
and has accounted for significant improvements in its original
design."8 5 The fruits of DOD's internal research and development
181. See A. Cox & S. Kisav, supra note 92, at 183-84.
182. See Greenhouse, Warplane Makers Feel Pressure to Cooperate, N.Y. Times. June 8.
1987, at D1, col. 1; Carrington, Budget Woes Force U.S., Europe to Collaborate on New Weapons,
Wall St. J.. Dec. 19. 1986, at 22. col. 1.
183. DOD presently is purchasing the AV-8B Harrier II fighter for the Marine Corps
from McDonnell Douglas and British Aerospace, which are producing the aircraft through
a joint venture. Great Britain also is buying Harrier aircraft produced by the joint venture
for its own use. See A. Cox & S. KizBy, supra note 92, at 179-210; see also Sugawara, French
Defense Finm Moving U.S. Offices to Cystal City, Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1987, 1 5 (Washington
Business) at 39, col. 1; Two Joint Ventures in Weapons Set, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, at D4,
col. 1. For foreign companies, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 is likely
to increase the attractiveness of forming joint ventures with American firms to penetrate the
market for weapons sales to DOD. Section 5021 of the statute gives the President authority
to curb foreign acquisitions of domestic firms where such acquisitions pose a threat to
national security. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
1 5021, 1988 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMiN. NEws (102 Stat.) 1107, 1425 (to be codified at 50
U.S.C. App. § 2158). The Act can be invoked to bar acquisitions, mergers, and takeovers,
but it does not apply to joint ventures.
184. DOD's existing network of government-owned and operated research institutions
and their activities are described in U.S. Officz oF TEcHNotocY AssEssmzN, supra note 152,
at 85-92.
185. Id. at 89.
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efforts might be made available to private firms to bid for
contracts to develop and produce new systems. 8 6
6. Dual-Sourcing
In some circumstances dual-sourcing is an appropriate competi-
tion strategy. The case for dual-sourcing is strongest when
reasonably anticipated production quantities can justify the
duplication of fixed costs associated with the maintenance of two
production lines.'87
When DOD chooses to dual-source a system in production,
DOD should take every possible opportunity to cease applying
regulatory structures created to ensure acceptable performance
in the absence of market constraints. The elimination or drastic
curtailment of data disclosure and auditing requirements is a
desirable consequence of the rivalry that dual-sourcing (and other
competition strategies) presumably will generate." Achieving this
result will entail steadfast efforts by DOD competition advocates
and other DOD leaders to resist efforts by DOD auditing and
oversight bureaus to insist that full data disclosure take place on
programs using dual-sourcing or other strategies that promise to
186. This approach to establishing a basis for competition in the production phase
of the acquisition cyde is suggested in Competition in Defense Procurement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sees.
3, 22-23, 28-29 (1968) (testimony of Murray Weidenbaum, Prof. of Economics, Wash. Univ.).
187. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. However, this is not meant to
imply that dual-sourcing is invariably inappropriate for programs involving comparatively
small numbers of total units, large unit costs, and low annual production runs. Even though
dual-sourcing may not be justified for the program at hand, selective use of dual-sourcing
may yield desirable spillovers across programs by discouraging sole-source supplier
opportunism. Such an approach also could convince sole-source suppliers that their
contracts are, at least in theory, contestable. This fact might induce them to limit costs more
extensively. For procurement episodes that may involve applications of this strategy, see
Read, Northrop Could Face More Scrutiny, Competition in Stealth Bomber Project, Wall St. J., Nov.
16, 1987, at 64, col. I (Air Force consideration of second-sourcing B-2 bomber); Cushman,
supra note 9 (Navy threat to second-source Trident submarines); Keller, U.S. Seeks Plane
Competition, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at D5, col. 1 (Navy threat to second-source F/A-
18 fighter). It is also conceivable that, wholly apart from any serious intent to initiate a
second source, DOD sometimes solicits competitive bids from a potential second supplier
and the incumbent producer mainly to gain cost data and other information useful to DOD.
See Anton & Yao, supra note 149; Goldberg, Competitive Bidding and the Production of
Precontract Information, 8 BELL J. EcoN. 250 (1977).
188. As suggested above, dual-sourcing may justify the waiver of the requirement
that contractors disclose and certify cost or pricing data before an agreement on the
contract price is reached.
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create significant incentives to improve performance." 9 Even in
ambiguous cases, it may be worthwhile initially to forego certain
disclosure requirements and instead monitor contractor conduct
to determine whether acceptable performance is forthcoming.
B. The LHX Program Reconsidered
The LHX program is useful for indicating how our approach
to teaming and dual-sourcing would dictate adjustments in DOD's
use of these acquisition strategies. As discussed above, the LHX
program uses far-reaching applications of teaming, both at the
prime contractor and subcontractor levels, and contemplates the
use of teaming as a foundation for dual-sourcing during full-scale
production.' In the words of the LHX Program Manager,
"Competition is the central focus of the LHX acquisition stra-
tegy."'' This Section assesses the wisdom of the Army's insistence
upon teaming and dual-sourcing the LHX program.
1. The Decision to Team
The Army's goal in pursuing its LHX teaming strategy has
been to ensure that two firms will be able to produce the new
helicopter.'92 The formation of rival contractor teams, Boeing
Vertol/Sikorsky and McDonnell Douglas/Bell Helicopter, to
compete for the LHX design award flowed from explicit guidance
from the Army program office. 9 The Army not only preferred
teaming, but it also appears to have played a substantial part in
determining the composition of the individual teams. Thus,
despite McDonnel Douglas's apparent preference to proceed uni-
189. Industry officials have complained that DOD too often has persisted in using
auditing and oversight techniques in conjunction with competition-oriented measures the
implementation of which should have obviated the need for most of the auditing and
oversight controls. See Hearings on Dep't of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3483-3515
(1987) (testimony of defense contractor executives).
190. Comprehensive descriptions of the LHX program appear in U.S. GEN.
AccoUwnNo OfficE, WEAoN SYSTEMS-IssUEs CONCERNING THE ARmy's LIGmHT HELICorT FAMILY
Paoow (May 1986); Anderson, Light Helicopter Family (LHX) Program Owrview, U.S. ARMY
Avu-noN DIG., Jan. 1987, at 38; Donnelley, Challenging Program Aims to Remedy Deficiencies in
Army's Helicopter Fleet, Defense News, Oct. 20, 1986, at 29.
191. Anderson, supra note 190, at 41.
192. See McDonnell, Bell Helicopter Form Team to Bid on LHX, AvIAiON WEEK & SPACE
TEaI., Apr. 14, 1986, at 25.
193. See Donnelly, Insiders Hear I.HX Wedding Bells for McDonnell Douglas, Bell, Defense
News, Apr. 7, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
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laterally or to pursue another teaming partner, the firm seems to
have yielded reluctantly to the Army's urging that it ally itself
with Bell-a firm that McDonnell Douglas is reported to have
viewed skeptically due to the aging condition of Bell's military
production facilities.'94 Moreover, both Bell and McDonnell Doug-
las had expressed serious reservations about collaborating on the
new helicopter program in light of Bell's substantial existing
commitment to the Navy's Osprey V-22 Tilt-rotor development
project. 9
Several considerations should have weighed heavily against the
Army's approach. First, there should exist a presumption that the
contractors, not the Army, are best situated to evaluate what type
of business structure is most likely to yield a superior design at
low cost. For example, it is probable that both McDonnell
Douglas and Bell are aware of the costs of collaborating with
another producer and are capable of determining when these
costs are outweighed by the need to spread financial risk or to
acquire needed technical expertise.
Second, even if DOD prefers teaming, forced partnerships of
firms that have low regard for each other are likely to incur
significant costs in executing a joint endeavor. McDonnell
Douglas's apparently unfavorable assessment of Bell's manufactur-
ing capabilities is unlikely to ;contribute to a harmonious relation-
ship.
A final factor against the LHX teaming configuration and
others like it is the conflicting interests of some teammates. Bell
and Boeing are teamed to produce the Osprey for the Navy, yet
the two companies are opponents in the LHX competition. The
LHX rivalry probably not only impedes desirable cooperation
between Bell and Boeing on the Osprey, but it diminishes the
likelihood that Bell and McDonnell Douglas will work together
effectively on the LHX. McDonnell Douglas probably has a
continuing concern about whether Bell's commitment to the
Osprey program will drain resources away from the LHX.
Moreover, the ability of the Osprey to perform certain missions
slotted for the LHX already has led Bell to suggest to the Army
that it reduce the scope of the LHX in favor of acquiring the
194. Id.
195. See Donnelly, McDonnell Douglas, Bell Team Up to Snare IX Billions, Defense
News, Apr. 14. 1986, at A2, col. 1.
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Osprey.9 6 Bell's suggestion could not have been received enthusi-
astically.by McDonnell Douglas.
The sole consideration that might support the Army's fostering
of teaming arrangements like that of the LHX is the desire to
establish a foundation for later dual-sourcing in full production,
or to maintain industry capability. Given the serious problems
associated with the existing LHX teaming arrangements, the
pursuit of alternative strategies would better enable the Army to
achieve its ends. For example, direct funding could sustain the
technical capability of valued helicopter manufacturers that do not
participate in the LHX. This type of funding could include the
letting of contracts for discrete research and development
projects.
2. The Commitment to Dual-Sourcing
The Army's commitment to dual-source the LHX also suffers
from serious drawbacks. The first stems from the use of teaming
as a platform for dual-sourcing. Firms that anticipate a future
period of head-to-head competition for a share of annual
production contracts are likely to experience substantial intrateam
tensions while pursuing joint design and development tasks. The
Army's current LHX strategy places the two prime contractors on
the winning team in the awkward position of having to compete
against one another for production awards.
The second problem with the Army's dual-sourcing plans is the
enormous uncertainty associated with the future size of the LHX
program. From a peak of 5000 planned units, the current
projected lifetime production run for the LHX now stands at
roughly 2000. In the last two years, severe funding pressures
have put the program's very survival at risk.'" Because further
curtailments are a strong possibility, it seems unwise to structure
the entire LHX program-and to invest in the development of
dual LHX assembly capabilities-on the assumption that two firms
will share in the annual production awards.
Early commitments to dual-sourcing should occur only when
the purchasing service can be reasonably confident that a
196. See Wilson, supra note 104.
197. See Baker, Army Spares LHXfrom Budget Ax, Defense News, Apr. 24, 1989, at 1,
col.1 (discussing pressures to reduce funding substantially for LHX in DOD's fiscal year
1990 budget); Carrington, Army Expected to Eliminate Copter Project, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1988,
at 6, col. 4 (describing plans to delete LHX from fiscal year 1989 budget).
Yale Journal on Regulation
program's weapons will be purchased in adequate numbers and
at sufficient annual rates. Only when it is apparent that the
lifetime and annual production runs will be substantial should the
service invest in the qualification of a second source. Such an
approach does not preclude the identification of subsystems for
which the establishment of second sources early in the program
life cycle would be justified (based on cost criteria) even if total
purchases were relatively modest. In addition, if a sole-source
supplier of the LHX were to perform poorly, the Army could use
other strategies already mentioned above, such as substituting
helicopters within its own inventory or within the inventories of
its allies, giving prototype contracts to other manufacturers whose
capability DOD has sustained, or threatening the introduction of
a second source to achieve a better result.
C. Institutional Prerequisites and Improvements
If DOD is to devise and apply competition strategies success-
fully, several institutional preconditions must be fulfilled. This
Section analyzes the necessary institutional elements of a program
that develops and implements sensible competition strategies for
acquiring major weapon systems. Some of these elements are
already in place, but others require additional action by Congress,
DOD, and other federal agencies.
1. Effective Monitoring of Implementation of Legislative Competition
Reforms
Recent statutes advocating competition-oriented defense
acquisition reforms have sought to alter fundamentally the
constraints and incentives facing DOD purchasing authorities.
Although these measures establish a procedural and substantive
bias favoring rivalry-based procurement techniques, they neces-
sarily confer substantial discretion upon DOD officials to deter-
mine how the competition mandate will be applied and, signifi-
cantly, when exceptions to the use of rivalry will be invoked. 98
198. The modern public choice literature has identified the limits on the ability of
legislatures to deny their "agents"-public agencies and departments-discretion to make
far-reaching policy choices in implementing legislative commands. "Modern government is
complex and many-sided, so much so that it would be impossible for legislatures to make
more than a tiny fraction of all genuine policy decisions," writes James Buchanan.
"Discretionary power must be granted to bureaucrats over wide ranges of decision."
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Thus, the effectiveness of rivalry-enhancing measures will depend
on the willingness of DOD to apply, and the skill with which it
implements, such policies, and on how effectively Congress
monitors and evaluates DOD's execution of the competition
mandate. 99
As one approach for making its competition reforms take hold
in defense procurement, Congress wisely mandated creation of an
institutional force within each DOD purchasing service-the Office
of the Competition Advocate-to promote the use of rivalry. To
ensure that DOD's competition advocates function effectively,
Congress must ensure that these officers possess the means to
guide DOD purchasing authorities toward fulfilling the commands
of the recent competition legislation. DOD should appoint high-
ranking military and civilian officers to head the competition
offices and assign sufficient numbers of capable personnel to carry
out the duties of the advocates' offices. Sustained congressional
support is essential if the advocates are to discourage purchasing
authorities from foregoing competition strategies in favor of sole-
source techniques that involve fewer initial administrative burdens
and require program officers to make fewer difficult judgments.
The President can help Congress by appointing DOD leader-
ship that is sympathetic to the aims of recent reform legislation.
The degree to which services embrace rivalry-based procurement
methods depends crucially upon the preferences of the Secretary
of Defense and the service secretaries. 00 Careful selection of high
appointees and scrutiny of their work are essential to future
success of the competition experiments.
Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theoty and Its Normative
Implications, in 2 THE TiEORY OF PUBLC CHoIcE, 11, 19 (J. Buchanan & R. Tollison eds.
1984).
199. By "monitoring" and "evaluation" we refer to public policy counterparts of the
metering, policing, and observation activities economists have identified as essential tasks
in the organization and administration of private firms. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 777 (1972). The landscape
of weapons acquisition policy since World War II contains the wreckage of numerous
reform efforts that failed for want of effective congressional monitoring. See Kovacic, supra
note 1.
200. In discussing John Lehman's pivotal role as Navy Secretary in prom(ting
competition, the Navy Competition Advocate General's report for fiscal year 1986 said,
"These last three and one half years have been marked by a profound change in the way
the Navy does business; this has been brought about more by people as opposed to
regulations .. . ." Fisci. Yut 1986 Off. OF THE COMP.rrlTION ADvocATE GE. OF THE NAVY
REP. TO CONo., supra note 45, at 111-2. See generally Pyatt, supra note 60.
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2. Personnel
The competition reforms discussed in this Article place a
premium on skillful planning and implementation. No feature of
the effort to rely more heavily on rivalry can succeed unless the
government personnel charged with carrying out the reforms are
equal to the task. If Congress and DOD wish to see competition
strategies improve the efficiency of weapons procurement, each
institution must commit itself to raising the capability of DOD's
acquisition personnel. As many informed observers have empha-
sized, significant, enduring improvements in weapons acquisition
will not occur without sustained efforts to increase the skills and
experience of those who represent the government in the
contracting process.2 0' To be applied effectively, rivalry strategies
require a sophisticated understanding of the contracting process,
the nature of the defense industry, and the technical require-
ments of the weapon systems. They also demand the benefits of
knowledge gained from repeated experience in grappling with
difficult problems. The ideal program office would consist of a
comparatively small number of exceptionally capable and experi-
enced individuals.
These are precisely the conditions that the current acquisition
process seldom provides. Contractor personnel are, on average,
better trained, better paid, more experienced, and more highly
motivated than their government counterparts. The proliferation
of regulatory controls can best be understood as a second-best
strategy to compensate for weaknesses in the government's
procurement corps. Because the government's acquisition
personnel are no match for the contractors, Congress and DOD
have attempted to balance the field by adding layers of procedur-
al "safeguards" and extensive internal review processes, all of
which are designed to reduce the likelihood of error. This tactic
has enormous costs. Programs move at a glacial pace, authority
is dispersed so widely that accountability is severely attenuated,
government payrolls expand, and contractors hire legions of
accountants and contract administration personnel to respond to
DOD's requests. This Article's rivalry-oriented recommendations
require a level of institutional skill that is the antithesis of this
layering tactic, and capable personnel are its first ingredient.
201. See, e.g., J. Fox, supra note 6; J. GANSI.R, supra note 6, at 207-14, 331-32; P.ACVAILD
COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 66.
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3. Administration
It is not enough to hire and retain capable procurement
personnel. It is vital that they receive the authority to manage
programs effectively. A central theme of postwar blue ribbon
defense commissions has been that clear lines of authority and
lean program structures are essential to give program managers
and acquisition specialists the incentives and power to manage
acquisition programs successfully.22 Program managers must have
the flexibility and responsibility to execute their duties and to be
made fully aware that they will be rewarded for success and held
accountable for failure. "If a program succeeds with cost savings
and quality performance, then the man or woman in charge
should be rewarded," writes former Navy Secretary Lehman."' "If
a program gets in trouble through ill management or inattention,
the program manager should be sacked.12 4
4. Competition Expertise
Congressional and DOD competition reforms have taken place
in a relative vacuum; little effort has been made to seek out
contributions from the government's various reservoirs of competi-
tion policy expertise, including the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
DOD's competition advocates rarely consult with the federal
antitrust agencies and seldom hire individuals with competition
policy expertise that matches the industrial organization capabili-
ties attained by the attorneys and economists of the Antitrust
Division and the FTC.205
202. See, e.g., FrrziuoH CoMMIssIoN, supra note 1, at 79-81; PACKARD COMMISSION, SUpr
note 1, at 53-55.
203. J. LniAwN, JR., supra note 6, at 265.
204. Id.
205. DOD and Antitrust Division cooperation has consisted chiefly of joint efforts to
facilitate the identification and prosecution of firms engaged in bid-rigging on DOD
contracts. See DOD's Inspector General Offers Guidance on Identifying, Investigating Bid Rigging,
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 52, at 545 (Mar. 19, 1987); Cox, Agency
Investigations of Anticompetitive Conduct: Techniques and Focus, 57 AsrrTusr LJ. 579 (1988).
Since 1986 the Antitrust Division has made bid-rigging by defense contractors a high
priority of its horizontal restraints enforcement program. See Ginsburg Will Continue Direction
of Division, Won't Revise Vertical Guides, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 55
(Jan. 9, 1986); Whalley, Priorities and Practices: The Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement
Program, 57 AinTusr L.J. 569 (1988).
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Since 1970, both agencies have made their competition
expertise available to federal, state, and local policymakers
through review and comment procedures that address the wisdom
of existing or contemplated regulatory measures."°' The agencies
could expand these competition advocacy efforts to include DOD.
Most important, Antitrust Division and FTC personnel could
advise DOD on formulating competition strategies for pending
and contemplated procurement programs, °7 and they could
counsel DOD purchasing officials on issues such as the desirability
and consequences of encouraging specific teaming arrangements
or dual-sourcing specific programs.
The latter consideration has become increasingly significant in
the current procurement environment. Federal acquisition
regulations do not confer antitrust immunity on teaming arrange-
ments, 08 yet the enthusiasm with which DOD now encourages
firms to pursue such collaboration may lull firms into believing
that such agreements will not receive federal antitrust scrutiny."9
206. For example, in fiscal year 1985 the FTC and its staff made over 70 appearances
before federal, state, and local bodies to discuss the competitive effects of existing or
proposed legislation and regulations. See FIsC. YnFa 1985 FEo. TRADE COMM'N ANN. REP. 89-
100 (1985); see also Kovacic, Built to Last? The Antitrust Legacy of the Reagan Administration, 34
FED. B. News & J. 244 (1988) (discussing intervention activities of federal antitrust agencies
during Reagan Administration); Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional
Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement: A Historical Perspective, in PUBLIC Citoice A.D RruLrIAnoN: A
VIEW FROM INSIDE nILE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 63, 87, 93 (R. Mackay, J. Miller III & B.
Yandle eds. 1987) (discussing development of modern FTC intervention program).
207. The defense industry poses unusual and difficult market definition and market
power analysis issues. See McMillan, Special Problems in Section 2 Sherman Act Cases Involving
Government Procurement: Market Definition, Measuring Market Power, and the Government as
Monopsonist, 51 AcnRus'r LJ. 689 (1982). Among other contributions, the federal antitrust
agencies could assist DOD in correctly evaluating the competitive significance of individual
defense suppliers and devising strategies to offset the efforts of individual suppliers to attain
and exploit market power. The antitrust agencies also could advise DOD about the wisdom
of various regulatory requirements that affect rivalry in various markets and determine the
price and quality of systems purchased by DOD. Economists at the Antitrust Division and
the FTC have accumulated expertise in a number of areas that might usefully be applied
to problems DOD confronts regularly, including warranties, innovation and rules governing
property rights in intellectual property, and the theory of contracts.
208. The Federal Acquisition Regulations set out limitations on the operation of
contractor teaming arrangements, stating that "nothing in this subpart authorizes contractor
team arrangements in violation of antitrust statutes .... " Federal Acquisition Regulations,
48 C.F.R. § 9.604 (1987).
209. On the application of federal antitrust doctrine to teaming arrangements among
government contractors, see Bergstrom Antitrust Immunity or Exemption for Activities Involving
Government Contracts--"Weapon Systems" and "Team Bidding," 59 Nw. U.L REv. 433 (1964);
Chierichella, Antitrust Considerations Affecting Teaming Agreements, 57 ANTnTRSTr L.J. 555 (1988);
Eger, Contractor Team Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 17 PUB. Co-r. L.J. 595 (1988);
Hibner, Antitrust Considerations of Joint Ventures, Teaming Agreements, Co-Production and Leader-
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Compounding this potential source of complacency are DOD
policies that promote wide-ranging swaps of technical data. The
emphasis on teaming and data transfers may become a latent
source of antitrust exposure for companies that assume DOD's
support, for such activities implicitly exempted them from the
application of the antitrust laws. Closer coordination between
DOD and the federal antitrust agencies on these issues would
serve to make clear that certain types of conduct-for example,
the exchange of pricing data-remain forbidden, notwithstanding
the existence of a teaming agreement that has DOD's blessing.10
An expanded role for federal antitrust authorities in defense
matters would have other benefits. Becoming more familiar with
the defense industry would place the Antitrust Division and the
FTC in a stronger position to assess the competitive significance
of mergers and acquisitions among defense firms, of which there
will likely be an increase. " ' Conditions of chronic overcapacity in
some areas coupled with efforts by firms to reposition themselves
to provide a different array of products are likely to confront the
antitrust agencies with mergers in defense-oriented markets whose
features the Antitrust Division and the FTC have examined infre-
quently in the past.21'
Follower Agreements, 51 Aarixusr LJ. 705 (1982); Owens, Preparing Team Agreements for
Government Contracts, 46 N.Y. SrAT B.J. 29 (1974); Van Gemert, Teaming Agreements: A
Planning Guide, TuE GovERNmErr Comcrvcroi: BRIEfiNG PAPERs, Apr. 1969, at 1. See also
Kovacic, Illegal Agreements with Competitors, 57 A-rrrtusr L.J. 517 (1988) (discussing antitrust
prohibitions upon agreements between direct rivals for government contracts).
210. For example, it is conceivable that episodes of alleged "collusion" that have
surfaced in public accounts of the Ill Wind investigation may prove to have stemmed from
DOD or service encouragement that contractors cooperate with their rivals.
211. Current trends indicate that many forthcoming acquisitions are likely to be
motivated by contractors' efforts to improve their capability in electronics. See Morrison,
supra note 83, at 1783 (reporting that one defense industry analyst had identified 70
transactions involving acquisition of electronics firms by defense contractors in 1986 alone).
212. Examples of past defense-related mergers that have come under government
antitrust scrutiny include PPG Industries's attempted acquisition of Swedlow in 1986 and
LTV's attempted purchase of Grumman in 1981. See FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d
1500 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); see also
FEo. TRADE COMM'N, Fi sr YFAR OF TilE NEW ADMINIrSTATION: A Paocsu'ss REPor 12 (Oct. 20,
1982) (describing FTC decision in 1981 to seek preliminary injunction to bar LTV's
takeover of Grumman). These and similar transactions involving defense suppliers are likely
to confront the antitrust agencies and courts with particularly difficult market definition
and market power measurement tasks in industries characterized by rapid technological
change. On the special problems that accompany market definition and market power
analysis in technologically dynamic industries, see Baxter, The Definition and Measurement of
Market Power in Industries Characterized by Rapidly Developing and Changing Technologies, 53
Axnrrrusr L.J. 717 (1984); Ordover & Willig, Antitrust for High Technology Industries: Assessing
Research Joint Ventures and Mergers, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 311 (1985).
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Finally, as purchasing policies come to rest more explicitly on
competition, and sales opportunities for some types of weapon
systems diminish, the antitrust agencies may receive more
allegations of exclusionary conduct by defense suppliers. Possible
theories suggested by recent antitrust literature and private
antitrust litigation involving defense firms include price-based
predation,"' nonprice predation based on efforts, such as the
manipulation of the contracting process, to raise the costs of rival
suppliers2 4 and refusals to deal concerning access to what might
be described as "essential facilities.2 25  Here too the antitrust
agencies could profit from greater familiarity with the markets
and regulatory structures in which the relevant transactions take
place. Even if such issues continue to be raised solely in the
context of private litigation, some tribunals might welcome amicus
appearances by the Antitrust Division and the FTC to sort out
difficult antitrust issues in what many federal judges no doubt
view as a complex and alien industry.
5. Evaluation
The development of sound competition policies requires
ongoing efforts to assess the impact of specific competition
initiatives. To make enlightened judgments about the appropriate
path of future programs, Congress and DOD must systematically
evaluate programs in which competition strategies have been
213. See Pacific Eng'g Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1977); Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Isikoff, U.S. Claims Goodyear Overcharged Pentagon, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 1988, at C3,
col. I (discussing predatory pricing suit filed by Irvin Industries against Goodyear Aerospace
Corp. concerning sales of bomb parachute to Army); Isikoff, Goodyear Accused of Contract Ploy,
Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at El, col. 2 (same); see also Sherrer, Predatory Pricing: An
Evaluation of Its Potential for Abuse Under Government Procurement Contracts, 6 J. Coap. L. 531
(1981); Prosecuting Contractors for Predatory Pricing Isn't Priority, Conferees Tol Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) No. 42, at 460 (Oct. 1, 1984).
214. See Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983). For a comprehensive exposition of emerging theories of
exdusion that involve strategies to raise rivals' costs, see Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompeti-
tive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YAu L.J. 209 (1986).
215. Such theories would build on the "essential facilities" doctrine articulated in
such cases as Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) and
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985). The potentially broad reach of Aspen is examined in Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers,
and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 CA~UF. L. Rxv. 959, 962-65 (1987). See also
Shockro, An Antitrust Analysis of the Relationship Between Prime Contractors and Their Subcontrac-
tors Under a Government Contract, 51 AN-rirrusr L.J. 725, 731-34 (1982) (discussing refusals to
deal).
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employed. 2 6 Especially important matters for analysis include cost,
quality, and schedule effects. Such assessments are particularly
significant given the high level of uncertainty about the effects of
past and ongoing dual-sourcing initiatives.
217
To assess the effects of legislative and policy reforms accurately,
Congress must forego the temptation to enact new reform
legislation over the next few years. If the cascade of military
reform legislation that began in 1981 continues unabated, it will
not only become an intolerable administrative burden, but it also
will impede efforts to determine what specific results have flowed
from individual reforms. A fundamental flaw of defense acquisi-
tion reform measures since World War II has been the failure to
follow through. Seeing a comparatively smaller number of reforms
to their conclusion is likely to be more valuable than executing
a multitude of measures that cannot be monitored.
Conclusion
The competition experiments of the 1980s are hardly the first,
and are surely not the last, wave of attempted reforms to sweep
over the defense acquisition process.' 8 However, even if utilization
of competition in defense procurement proves to be merely the
latest short-term fascination of policymakers, competition theories
are deeply affecting several programs of lasting significance to
U.S. defense policy. How skillfully the armed services apply
competition doctrine in current acquisition programs is a matter
of genuine consequence.
The importance of competition reforms in this decade extends
beyond their influence upon specific acquisition programs. The
Justice Department's ongoing investigation into defense procure-
ment practices has provided yet another occasion for policymakers
to consider the appropriate shape of this country's weapons
acquisition process. The fragmentary revelations from the current
inquiry have led numerous legislators to propose new statutory
and regulatory controls for purchasing officials and contractors.
216. The need for ongoing evaluation and suggested subjects for study are discussed
in K. AxtRAIIH.D. supra note 16, at 58-59; M. Rich & E. Dews, supra note 54, at 47. From
our discussions with DOD procurement officials, it is apparent that DOD is doing some
work of this type.
217. Ilere is considerable dispute and uncertainty concerning the cost results of
past dual-sourcing episodes. See K. AntuiIIIA.t, supra note 16, at 53-55; M. Rich & E. Dews,
supra note 54, at 49-50.
218. See Kovacic, supra note 1; J. Fox, supra note 22, at 1-7.
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Many of these proposals explicitly or implicitly assume that
existing procurement policies-including the competition initiatives
of this decade-confer excessive discretion upon defense suppliers
and purchasing authorities.
However, the Ill Wind investigation has not discredited the use
of rivalry in weapons procurement. Some commentators have
attributed the recent acquisition scandal to DOD's expanded use
of rivalry-based procurement strategies. 1 9 This interpretation is
superficially appealing, but suspect. If any change in the defense
procurement process has intensified incentives to engage in fraud
and other misconduct, it is more likely to have been the ongoing
decline in new program starts rather than the competition-
oriented reforms of this decade. The true underlying force
probably has been each supplier's realization that failure to secure
a role in one or more of a declining number of programs forces
the company's withdrawal from major markets or from defense
contracting altogether. This pressure has been far more intense
than any imposed by the prospect of dual-sourcing.22
Perhaps the greatest harm of the Ill Wind scandal is that the
preoccupation with contractor and purchaser fraud will deflect
attention away from equally important efforts to eliminate deep-
seated institutional and structural causes of weak management and
poor performance. The Packard Commission's 1986 report
correctly concluded that "[t]he nation's defense programs lose far
more to inefficiency than to dishonesty .... Though government
oversight is critically important to the acquisition process, no
conceivable number of additional federal auditors, inspectors,
investigators, and prosecutors can police it fully, much less make
it work more effectively." '' Indeed, as several observers have
emphasized, a chief cause of inefficiency in weapons acquisition
219. See Carrington & Pound, supra note 18.
220. Put another way, abandoning dual-sourcing as an acquisition strategy will hardly
weaken the incentives for contractors to work their way into one or more of the ever
smaller number of major new programs. Almost all of the misconduct alleged to date in
the Ill Wind investigation has dealt with the predesign award phase of the procurement
cycle, rather than efforts by contractors to manipulate the outcome of a split award in a
dual-sourcing regime. If collusion is established, vigorous enforcement of existing criminal
sanctions is appropriate and, we believe, sufficient to control such behavior-just as such
remedies are applied to collusion in commercial settings.
221. PACXARD CoMMIssIoN. supra note 1, at 77-78.
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is the extraordinary complexity of the regulatory process with
which DOD and its suppliers must contend.222
Accordingly, the existing Justice Department inquiry does not
provide a basis for the immediate imposition of new regulatory
controls. Put in its starkest terms, the acquisition process would
be well served if Congress enacted no substantial new procure-
ment legislation in 1989. The Ill Wind inquiry has moved at a
slower pace than originally predicted, and it is too early to base
major policy adjustments upon the limited results of the investiga-
tion released to date. Moreover, a moratorium on new legislation
would permit weapons acquisition policymakers to begin to assess
more clearly the consequences of the considerable body of
legislation that Congress already has enacted in this decade.2,
The relentless annual stream of major new procurement legisla-
tion since 1980 has made it virtually impossible to determine
which acquisition reforms have been effective and which have not.
Little will be lost, and much could be gained, from only a year's
pause in this activity.
222. The Packard Commission in 1986 warned that "the legal regime for defense
acquisition is today impossibly cumbersome." PIu.sIorMx's BLUE RIBBoN COMMIssION ON DEFENSE
MANGF.MENr, A FORMULA FOI ACr-oN-A R EFosr "TO tniE PEFSIDENr ON DEFENSE AcQuIsrnIoN 18
(1986) [hereinafter FORMUlA FoR AcrioNl. John Lehman's account of his service as Navy
Secretary provides a graphic indication of the complexity of the regulatory system. "By
actual measurement in 1985, existing legislation and case law governing navy procurement
alone had grown to 1,152 linear feet of shelf space in the library." J. L.iih,, JR., supra
note 6, at 191; see also J. GAxSLER. supra note 6 at 150-54; Weidenbaum, Wether It's Bombers
or Cookies, Filling Pentagon Orders Is a Drag, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 15, 1988, at 12;
Kelman, Defense Bureaucracy's Corrupting Influence, Wall St. J., July 6, 1988, at 22, col. 3.
223. In 1986, the Packard Commission observed that "[o]ver the years, Congress and
DOD have tried to dictate management improvements in the form of ever more detailed
and extensive laws or regulations." FORMU.A FOR A ,ON, supra note 222, at 18. The Packard
panel added that "[tihe sheer weight of such requirements often makes well-conceived
reform efforts unavailing. At operating levels within DOD, it is now virtually impossible to
assimilate new legislative or regulatory refinements promptly or effectively." Id. The Packard
Commission's observation has had no evident effect upon legislative policymaking. In 1988
alone, Congress enacted eight statutes embodying major substantive changes to the
regulatory framework governing the activities of DOD and its suppliers. See Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 1988 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102 Stat.)
4181; Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-656, 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NE:ws (102 Stat.) 3853; Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-463, 1988 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AuMIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 2270;
Major Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-700, 1988 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws (102
Stat.) 4631; National Defense Authorization At, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456,
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1918; Office of Federal Procurement Policy
Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-679, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (102
Stat.) 4055; Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-418, 1988
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This Article has proposed refinements to what is a desirable
commitment by Congress and DOD to rely more upon competi-
tion to elicit better performance in the acquisition of major
weapon systems. Since 1981, Congress and DOD have established
much of the necessary statutory and institutional foundation for
making broader reliance on rivalry-based strategies an integral,
useful element of DOD major systems procurement.
To ensure that competition approaches have lasting, favorable
effects in future DOD acquisition activities, Congress and DOD
must devote their immediate attention to accomplishing four
goals. First, Congress and DOD should sustain their overall
commitment to competition-oriented purchasing techniques as the
central ingredients of DOD weapons acquisition policy. Although
competition has made substantial inroads in DOD procurement
practice, the emphasis on rivalry. remains vulnerable to forces
inside and outside the Pentagon that would prefer to abandon
competition in all but a small number of circumstances. Suppliers
who recall the comfort of largely uncontested contractual
relationships and purchasing authorities who prefer the simpler
administrative tasks and easier judgments associated with non-
rivalry based policies may resist continued use of competition-
oriented approaches2 4 It is well worth Congress's expenditure of
monitoring resources to make clear that a preference for
consideration of rivalry-based strategies-albeit a rebuttable
preference-is here to stay.2"5
Although a commitment to consider competition strategies
seriously is sound policy, significant refinements to current
approaches to using rivalry in weapons acquisition are also appro-
priate. Reassessment and adjustment are essential steps in
undertaking a successful transition from one regulatory scheme to
another.2" Thus, a second necessary condition for success in
224. It is possible that the Navy's almost single-minded dedication to dual-sourcing
has stemmed from its concern that any apparent retreat from a total commitment to
competitive procurement strategies might signal the faltering of its institutional will and
might spur opponents of the competition initiatives to topple the program.
225. It is essential that Congress and DOD, having set competition policies in motion,
allow them to operate long enough to obtain meaningful, measurable results and to
convince the armed services and their suppliers that the emphasis upon competition is not
a short-term phenomenon so typical of procurement "reforms" in defense purchasing.
Numerous postwar reforms have foundered for want of the necessary commitment to
monitor their implementation over the medium- and long-terms. See Kovacic, supra note 1.
226. See Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CAU-. L.
Rsv. 1005 (1987); Kahn, Comment: Deregulatoy Schizophrenia, 75 CAim. L. REv. 1059 (1987).
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applying the recent defense acquisition competition reforms is that
DOD and Congress evaluate rivalry approaches critically and
improve the mechanism through which competition strategies are
devised and executed.
The evaluation of existing policies should include more
complete consideration of the potential disadvantages of using
teaming arrangements-particularly collaborations that overlap
related programs-as foundations for dual-sourcing. Congress
should adopt a presumption against employing policies that
mandate teaming arrangements among horizontal rivals. Similarly,
DOD should reexamine its overriding focus on dual-sourcing as
the chief means for promoting rivalry. Such a strategy is appro-
priate in a comparatively small number of instances. Dual-sourcing
should be seen as one of a collection of techniques for achieving
the principal objectives, such as superior performance on
individual programs and the maintenance of contractor capability,
that DOD has sought to attain.
The formulation of competition-oriented acquisition options and
the choice of optimal strategies likewise would benefit from an
effort to improve the institutional processes through which
competition concerns are considered. In particular, the participa-
tion of attorneys and economists with experience in industrial
organization and antitrust-topics directly related to the competi-
tion issues now confronting DOD acquisition personnel-would
advance the goal of devising and applying effective rivalry
strategies in weapons acquisition. Professionals with such experi-
ence could easily be added to the competition advocacy offices of
each service and, if appropriate, assigned to specific programs.
Furthermore, stronger ties between DOD and the federal
antitrust agencies would strengthen the quality of DOD competi-
tion analysis. A closer liaison with the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division and the FTC would give DOD a sounder basis
for analyzing defense markets, identifying methods for stimulating
rivalry, and assessing the soundness of policies, such as those
involving data rights, pricing terms, and warranties, that affect the
price and quality of major systems. Greater familiarity with
defense industry markets and DOD procurement regulations and
practice also would place the antitrust enforcement agencies in a
stronger position to analyze, among other things, an increasing
number of mergers and acquisitions involving defense suppliers.
Devising and executing sensible rivalry strategies supplies the
basis for achieving the third necessary condition of successful
competition reform: the deemphasis of regulatory controls
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predicated on the absence of rivalry as a constraint upon
contractor discretion."' Where the influence of rivalry is substan-
tial, the role of financial oversight and auditing must diminish. As
contractors assume greater risks, the financial rewards for success
must increase accordingly. Moving in these directions will also
serve to achieve leaner program structures in which government
and private officials assume more responsibility for selecting
efficient acquisition methods and have sharper incentives to
choose wisely."'
None of these proposals can succeed if DOD lacks the human
capital necessary to execute rivalry strategies capably. Thus, a
fourth major object of policymaking concern should be the
recruitment and retention of capable professionals to oversee and
to manage DOD's major acquisition programs. Despite repeated,
hard-edged warnings from numerous authorities, the United
States has spent most of the postwar era indulging the illusion
that it can get superior acquisition results from an acquisition
corps that too often lacks the responsibility, motivation, skills, and
experience to do the job well. In major respects, the sheer mass
and complexity of the defense procurement system is a dismal
concession to the limitations of the people who buy the systems;
costly, time-consuming procedural and oversight "safeguards" are
established to compensate for shortcomings in staff skill and
experience.
The Bush Administration and Congress face difficult questions
about how to satisfy weapons procurement needs amid pressures
to reduce or to hold constant the level of overall defense
expenditures. The path for acquisition policymaking presented in
this Article offers a promising way to increase the defense
capability that the government attains from a given level of
outlays. It creates incentives for improved contractor performance
227. In major respects the appeal of emphasizing competitive purchasing techniques
resides in their capacity to displace, at least in part, a costly and unsatisfactory system of
regulation. "Encouraging defense contractors to rely more heavily on their own resources
through the strengthening of competition," Murray Weidenbaum wrote in 1974. -will help
bring about a reconstitution of the self-regulating mechanism of free enterprise, which is
still the best guarantee of innovation, efficiency, and lower costs. The existing practice of
extensive government regulation clearly has not worked, and we need to try another
approach." M. WVIDENBAUM, supra note 22, at 85.
228. The Packard Commission observed that "DOD must displace systems and
structures that measure quality by regulatory compliance and solve problems by executive
fiat. Excellence in defense management can not be achieved by numerous management
layers, large staffs, and countless regulations in place today." PACKARD COMMISION, supra
note 1, at xiii.
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and provides a basis for significant reductions in the number of
DOD and contractor personnel assigned to perform contract
administration functions. Rather than requiring substantial,
additional legal authority, this Article's policy prescriptions apply
and refine a mandate already in place. The crucial question is
whether Congress, President Bush, and DOD have the institution-
al will, perseverance, and discipline to see this and other reform
programs through to successful implementation.

